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NEW INNOVATION MODELS IN MEDICAL AI 
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In recent years, scientists and researchers have devoted considerable 
resources to developing medical artificial intelligence (AI) technologies. Many of 
these technologies—particularly those which resemble traditional medical 
devices in their functions—have received substantial attention in the legal and 
policy literature. But other types of novel AI technologies, such as those that relate 
to quality improvement and optimizing use of scarce facilities, have been largely 
absent from the discussion thus far. These AI innovations have the potential to 
shed light on important aspects of health innovation policy. First, these AI 
innovations interact less with the legal regimes that scholars traditionally 
conceive of as shaping medical innovation: patent law, FDA regulation, and 
health insurance reimbursement. Second, and perhaps related, a different set of 
innovation stakeholders, including health systems and insurers, are conducting 
their own research and development in these areas without waiting for 
commercial product developers to innovate for them. Third and finally, the 
activities of these innovators have implications for health innovation policy and 
scholarship. Perhaps most notably, data possession and control play a larger role 
in determining capacity to innovate in this space, while ability to satisfy the 
quality standards of regulators and payers plays a smaller role, relative to more 
familiar biomedical innovations such as new drugs and devices.  
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Innovation in medical AI is exploding. Every week sees new research papers 
presenting new algorithms, new companies launching new products, and new 
possibilities for change. AI products promise to recognize and diagnose skin 
cancer, to identify eye disease, to find kidney stones, to locate brain 
hemorrhages, and to quickly detect COVID-19, among many other possibilities.1 
These technologies are likely to change the practice of medicine by increasing 
the capabilities of care providers in many areas. Products like these also fit—if 
 
1 Am. Coll. of Radiology Data Sci. Inst., FDA Cleared AI Algorithms (2020), 
https://www.acrdsi.org/DSI-Services/FDA-Cleared-AI-Algorithms; Andrew A.S. 
Soltan et al., Rapid Triage for COVID-19 Using Routine Clinical Data for 
Patients Attending Hospital: Development and Prospective Validation of an 
Artificial Intelligence Screening Test, 3 LANCET DIG. HEALTH E78 (Dec. 11, 2020), 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S2589-7500(20)30274-0. 
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somewhat uncomfortably2—into a capacious understanding of what medical 
devices and medical technology look like and how we expect them to be 
regulated. But these are not the only AI products with the potential to transform 
medicine. 
Other AI innovations look quite unlike typical medical devices, but also have 
the potential to transform health care in different ways.3 A seemingly mundane 
example is AI-powered scheduling software, which predicts the ebb and flow of 
patients within the health-care system and allocates staff to most effectively 
meet those patients’ needs. Such products do not directly diagnose or treat 
patients, but they could increase the capacity of a stretched system and thereby 
save lives. Other products improve quality of care by predicting the likelihood 
that a patient will be readmitted to the hospital within a month (so that health-
care providers can work with patients to prevent that undesirable outcome) or 
by identifying the risk of a patient developing sepsis (so that rapid-response 
teams can intervene early). These functions are essential to the health-care 
system, and all are amenable to AI assistance. 
For these forms of AI innovation, however, the traditional policy levers that 
shape much biomedical innovation—patents, FDA regulation, and insurance 
reimbursement4—play more uncertain and attenuated roles. Although many 
innovators are actively pursuing patents, the patentability of medical AI under 
U.S. law is unclear, making it risky to enforce AI patents that may be held 
invalid. Patents may also be less important to would-be innovators because AI 
innovations are often easy to protect via trade secrecy. Some of these 
technologies may get less scrutiny from FDA, either because they do not fit 
within the statutory definition of medical devices or because they fall within 
categories for which FDA has traditionally exercised discretion not to enforce its 
authorities. And insurance reimbursement, which normally helps both to drive 
the development of medical technology and to provide some quality-related 
oversight, plays little role here, as these products are typically not directly 
reimbursable. The usual incentives of insurance reimbursements or patent law 
exclusivity are thus lower for these forms of innovation, but barriers to entry 
 
2 See, e.g., W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Black-Box Medicine, 116 MICH. 
L. REV. 421 (2017). 
3 See W. Nicholson Price II, Artificial Intelligence in the Medical System: 
Four Roles for Potential Transformation, 21 YALE J.L. & TECH. SPECIAL ISSUE 
122 (2019). 
4 To be clear, other laws do shape innovation in this space, including privacy 
laws, human subjects research protections, and trade secrecy, though they are 
not our focus here. See, e.g., SHARONA HOFFMAN, ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS 
AND MEDICAL BIG DATA: LAW AND POLICY (2017) (providing an overview of 
medical big data law); W. Nicholson Price II & I. Glenn Cohen, Privacy in the 
Age of Medical Big Data, 25 NATURE MED. 37 (2019) (describing medical privacy 
laws); Kayte Spector-Bagdady & Reshma Jagsi, Big Data, Ethics, and 
Regulations: Implications for Consent in the Learning Health System, 45 MED. 
PHYSICS e845 (2018) (describing human subjects protection law); Arti K. Rai, 
Risk Regulation and Innovation: The Case of Rights-Encumbered Biomedical 
Data Silos, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1641 (2016) (describing regulation and 
secrecy). 
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from FDA or insurer oversight are lower as well. We do not argue that these 
regimes are absent—some innovators in this space do seek patents and FDA 
approval or clearance. Nonetheless medical AI innovation faces a substantially 
different legal landscape than more traditional biomedical innovation such as 
the development of new physical devices or drugs.5  
Within this landscape, innovation by end users of medical AI is flourishing. 
Health systems (including individual academic medical centers and hospitals) 
and insurers are not only developing and using AI technologies themselves, but 
they are also setting up in-house venture capital funds to invest in startups. 
Health systems and insurers have different incentives than typical biomedical 
innovators (such as drug and device manufacturers). Their primary purpose for 
innovating is not to sell innovative products to customers. Instead, they are 
developing innovative AI tools to enhance their main business of providing, 
insuring, or facilitating health care. In the theoretical model elucidated by Eric 
von Hippel, they are user innovators, rather than manufacturers.6 They benefit 
directly from using their innovations rather without having to sell or license 
them to others (though they may do both). User innovators are more likely to 
focus on their own specific needs and circumstances, creating more customized 
products rather than broadly available products.7 
To be clear, users are not the only innovators of medical AI. Large technology 
companies are developing AI-powered health software, as are small startups. 
And the IT infrastructure providers of health care, the makers of electronic 
health record (EHR) software, are themselves developing AI algorithms and 
incorporating them into EHR products. But the innovation incentives for 
commercial product developers are somewhat more traditional, and not our 
focus here. 
 
5 We recognize that “difference” demands a baseline. We focus on the 
biomedical innovation baseline because the actors we consider here operate 
largely in the world of drugs, devices, and other biomedical innovations. But we 
recognize that this is not the only potential baseline. Interesting insights could 
come from focusing on the different baseline of software innovation generally, 
and considering how medical AI differs from other software, where patents are 
of disputed value and FDA regulation and insurance reimbursement are non-
players. See generally, e.g., Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and 
Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2001) (analyzing the 
scope of protection that should be afforded to software patents); John R. Allison 
& Ronald J. Mann, The Disputed Quality of Software Patents, 85 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 297 (2007) (considering the quality of software patents); Colleen V. Chien, 
Reforming Software Patents, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 325 (2012) (placing reform 
proposals for software into historical context). Such an analysis could examine 
the impact on software development of heightened regulatory scrutiny relative 
to an all-software baseline, rather than the diminished scrutiny relative to 
medical devices generally that we discuss here. Although that is not this paper, 
our analysis does explore the ways in which software-like features of medical AI 
pose challenges for both FDA regulation and patent protection of these medical 
innovations. See infra Parts III.A, III.B. 
6 ERIC VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION 1, 5 (2005). 
7 Id. 63–76. 
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The rise of user innovation in biomedical AI has several implications for 
policymakers. First, it is worth considering that the different legal landscape in 
this setting may be making room for different kinds of innovators to develop 
different forms of innovation. Just as the ordinarily robust legal regimes that 
provide patents, FDA regulation, and insurance reimbursement shape typical 
biomedical innovation in drugs and devices,8 the smaller roles these regimes 
play may shape the different forms of innovation that we observe in this space. 
Second, the availability and control of data confers a significant comparative 
advantage on some innovators in this field. AI is easier to develop in-house for 
health systems or insurers with their own large stocks of patient health 
information. Smaller institutions, or commercial firms without access to such 
data, may be incapable of competing. Third, a proliferation of biomedical user 
innovators brings challenges as well as opportunities. User innovators tend to 
design technologies tailored to their own needs and circumstances,9 which may 
differ from the circumstances of other potential users. Even larger institutional 
datasets are limited in scope, limiting the power and generalizability of AI 
solutions based on those datasets. Problems of error, overfitting, or data biases 
might go unrecognized without effective oversight from FDA or insurers. These 
effects have broader impacts on quality, cost, and equity of medical AI more 
generally. 
The rest of this Article proceeds in three Parts. Part II canvasses the 
landscape of nontraditional innovation in medical AI and describes the novel 
innovators involved, focusing on the roles and incentives of health systems and 
health insurers. Part III looks to the primary regimes that scholars have 
generally recognized as shaping biomedical innovation—patent law, FDA 
oversight, and insurance reimbursement—and explains how their role is 
diminished or uncertain for these technologies. Part IV addresses the 
implications of these analyses, including concerns around the availability of 
data, the customization of local solutions to local problems, and risks of difficult-
to-detect quality concerns. A few brief thoughts conclude. 
 
II. NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND NEW INNOVATORS 
 
AI powers a proliferating set of new medical technologies. Some AI tools are 
directly involved in patient care, such as systems that diagnose medical issues 
or monitor patients for signs of medical problems that can be aided by early 
intervention. Some function more in the background, such as algorithms to 
predict the likelihood of future adverse outcomes. Still others are even further 
removed from the point of patient care, monitoring and shaping the flow of 
patients or care providers across a hospital to increase system efficiency or to 
 
8 See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 
13 MICH. TELECOMMS. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 370 (2007); Amy Kapczynski & 
Talha Syed, The Continuum of Excludability and the Limits of Patents, 122 YALE 
L. J. 1900 (2013); Rachel E. Sachs, Prizing Insurance: Prescription Drug 
Insurance as Innovation Incentive, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 153, 193, 201–08 
(2016) (hereinafter Sachs, Prizing Insurance). 
9 VON HIPPEL, supra note 6, at 33-44. 
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increase the volume of care provided. Each of these avenues has the potential to 
impact the health-care landscape and the experience of patient care. 
The new technologies we consider here fall largely outside the scope of 
existing policy and legal scholarship on medical AI. That small but growing body 
of scholarship has considered legal aspects of commercially developed AI-driven 
products that directly drive or inform patient care and that pass through FDA’s 
traditional review process.10 An example is IDx-DR, a software program that 
autonomously diagnoses more-than-mild diabetic retinopathy based on images 
of the base of the retina. IDx-DR was cleared in 2018 by FDA as a Class II 
medical device and has since been sold commercially and implemented at sites 
around the country.11 FDA has cleared dozens of medical devices12 that rely on 
AI to perform a function like classification, diagnosis, or risk prediction. These 
products, while important, are not our focus here. Instead, we consider the vast 
breadth of AI-powered medical technology that arises outside the typical 
development path.  
In many ways the new innovators we consider in this project—health 
systems and insurers—can be thought of as user innovators. They innovate to 
address their own immediate problems or to adapt available technologies to 
work for their purposes, when commercially available products are inadequate 
to address those needs.13 This distinguishes these innovators from companies 
 
10 See, e.g., Barbara J. Evans & Frank Pasquale, Product Liability Suits for 
FDA-Regulated AI/ML Software, in Innovation and Protection: The Future of 
FDA Medical Device Regulation (I. Glenn Cohen, Nicholson Price, Timo Minssen 
& Carmel Shachar eds. 2021 forthcoming); Price, supra note 2; Charlotte 
Tschider, Preempting the Artificially Intelligent Machine, B.Y.U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3443987. 
11 See Food & Drug Admin., Letter to Janice Hogan (Apr. 11, 2018), 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/pdf18/DEN180001.pdf (classifying 
IDx-DR as a Class II medical device); Food & Drug Admin., FDA Permits 
Marketing of Artificial Intelligence-Based Device to Detect Certain Diabetes-
Related Eye Problems (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-
announcements/fda-permits-marketing-artificial-intelligence-based-device-
detect-certain-diabetes-related-eye; Aimee Breaux, With New CEO, Artificial 
Intelligence Start-Up Expects 2020 to Be “Year of Mass Adoption,” IOWA CITY 
PRESS CITIZEN (Dec. 11, 2019), https://www.press-
citizen.com/story/news/2019/12/11/coralville-ai-start-up-expects-2020-year-
mass-adoption/4398173002/ (“Abramoff said IDx has sold these devices to 
around two dozen hospital systems. . . In November, the company announced a 
new type of client, retail clinics. The company closed a deal with grocery store 
chain Albertsons to outfit five of the company's retail clinics with IDx cameras.”). 
12 As of September 2020, 64 machine learning or AI-based algorithms and 
devices had been approved by the FDA. See Stan Benjamens et al., The State of 
Artificial Intelligence-Based FDA-Approved Medical Devices and Algorithms: An 
Online Database, 3 NPJ DIGITAL MEDICINE 1, 1 (2020). To be sure, there is 
substantial contestable space about what in this field counts as a “medical 
device;” we consider those questions to some extent in Part III.A. 
13 Importantly, we do not mean to suggest that commercial products are not 
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specializing in the development and sale of cutting-edge health care technologies 
in the pharmaceutical or medical device area. Those companies identify 
potential new therapeutic products and shepherd them through costly 
premarket testing, navigating complex federal bureaucracies to secure 
intellectual property rights, FDA clearance or approval to gain market access, 
and insurance reimbursement procedures to ensure commercial success. The 
cost, risk, and time needed to bring to market a new pharmaceutical14 or medical 
device15 limit the companies that are able to succeed in this complex 
environment. Pharmaceutical and medical device companies specialize in 
dealing with these regulatory structures and are shaped by these legal and 
financial dynamics. 
The medical AI innovation context we examine here is quite different. FDA 
regulation, patents, and insurance payments still matter, but the costs of 
navigating the legal landscape are less daunting, and the rewards more 
uncertain (as we will discuss infra, in Part III). Innovation depends less on 
ability to conduct clinical trials that will satisfy FDA than on access to large 
volumes of data collected in the course of clinical care. In this environment, 




available to serve these goals. For instance, Epic, the largest EHR vendor in the 
United States, Meg Bryant, Epic, Cerner Control 85% of Large Hospital EHR 
Space, KLAS Reports, HEALTHCARE DIVE, (May 2, 2019), 
https://www.healthcaredive.com/news/epic-cerner-control-85-of-large-hospital-
ehr-space-klas-reports/553906/, has developed and implemented a sepsis 
predictor, in addition to the health system-developed ones we describe in this 
Part. Bill Silwicki, Health System Uses Epic EHR Communications Tech to 
Reduce Sepsis Mortality Rate by 20%, HEALTHCARE IT NEWS (October 1, 2019), 
https://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/health-system-uses-epic-ehr-
communications-tech-reduce-sepsis-mortality-rate-20. But even with the 
existence of tools like these, many health systems have chosen to develop their 
own products. 
14 Although the precise cost to develop a new drug is hotly debated, there is 
no question that pharmaceuticals are among the most costly new products to 
bring to market, with estimates typically placing the cost to develop a new drug 
at well over a billion dollars. See, e.g., Joseph A. DiMasi et al., Innovation in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry: New Estimates of R&D Costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20, 
20 (2016) (estimating pre-approval costs to be $2.558 billion); OFF. HEALTH 
ECON., THE R&D COST OF A NEW MEDICINE (2013), 
http://www.slideshare.net/OHENews/rd-cost-of-anew-medicine-mestre-
ferrandiz-19-jan2013 (estimating costs at $1.5 billion); Cynthia M. Ho, Drugged 
Out: How Cognitive Bias Hurts Drug Innovation, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 419, 426, 
448–57 (2014). 
15 Josh Makower et al., FDA Impact on U.S. Medical Innovation 28 (Nov. 
2010), 
http://eucomed.org/uploads/Press%20Releases/FDA%20impact%20on%20U.S.%
20Medical%20Technology%20Innovation.pdf (estimating the cost of developing 
a Class III medical device at $94 million). 
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A.  Health Systems 
 
Health systems16 are longtime stakeholders in health care, playing an 
integral role in the delivery of health care services as well as in health care 
research. However, they have typically not been a focus of legal academic 
scholarship around the development of new health care technology products.17 
To be sure, the medical literature recognizes that hospitals—particularly 
academic medical centers—serve as research sites in the clinical trials process, 
providing patients for enrollment in trials seeking to test the safety and efficacy 
of a candidate drug or device.18 But in these contexts the outside product 
manufacturer may be the party in control of the research, rather than the 
hospital or broader health system itself.  
These dynamics are different in the context of AI technologies, where health 
systems have played a larger role in driving the development of a wide range of 
innovative AI products. Their incentives to innovate, however, are different from 
the incentives of the product developing firms that are the focus of much of the 
scholarly literature. In the AI context, health systems are less concerned with 
the ability to obtain patents, the prospect of securing insurance reimbursement 
for their new products, or the need to traverse the FDA clearance or approval 
process.  
Instead, health systems are motivated by different types of goals. Very 
commonly, they seek to reduce costs, increase clinical volume and revenue, 
improve quality, and satisfy genuine scientific curiosity. Importantly, though, 
health systems may be unable to serve these goals with one-size-fits-all AI 
products. Products that will achieve these goals are likely to vary substantially 
across health systems, not only because different health systems may weight 
 
16 By health system, we mean a set of health care organizations that are 
contractually affiliated with each other, particularly including the relationship 
between hospitals and outpatient physician organizations. See, e.g., Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality, Defining Health Systems (Sept. 2017), 
https://www.ahrq.gov/chsp/chsp-reports/resources-for-understanding-health-
systems/defining-health-systems.html. While we recognize that individual 
hospitals may have slightly different incentives and capacities than health 
systems, for the sake of convenience we generally include individual hospitals 
within the broad term “health system.” 
17 Of course, considerable research occurs in hospitals, particularly in 
academic medical centers, including developing new medical procedures or 
protocols. But legal scholarship in intellectual property and innovation policy 
has largely focused on the commercial development of new health care 
technology products, perhaps in part because the Patent Act explicitly bars the 
enforcement of patents granted on medical procedures. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c); 
Jonas Anderson, Nonexcludable Surgical Method Patents, 61 WILLIAM & MARY 
L. REV. 637, 657 (2020).  
18 See, e.g., Thomas Bodenheimer, Uneasy Alliance – Clinical Investigators 
and the Pharmaceutical Industry, 342 N. ENG. J. MED. 1539, 1539 (2000); 
Hamilton Moses, III et al., Collaborating with Industry – Choices for the 
Academic Medical Center, 347 N. ENG. J. MED. 1371, 1371–72 (2002). 
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these goals differently, but also because they have different patient populations 
and different structural constraints and will need to customize and train their 
AI products to accommodate those differences. Hospitals of different sizes, with 
different specialties, or with different seasonal patient volumes will need to 
develop different ways of managing capacity strain and provider staffing, for 
example.  
These features make it useful to understand the development of AI models 
by health systems (sometimes in collaboration with external firms) as examples 
of user innovation.19 AI allows health systems to address needs that differ 
sufficiently across institutions that off-the-shelf models are unlikely to be 
immediately useful to them. Moreover, health systems also possess sufficient 
resources to develop their own models (or at least to contribute substantially to 
the development of such models).20 Medical AI tools trained on their own data 
offer health systems opportunities to make improvements in their own 
operations at reasonable cost. Use of their own data both limits the costs of 
innovation and ensures that the results are targeted to their own needs and 
circumstances.  
First and most prominently, health systems may feel pressure to compete on 
quality, especially in light of HHS’ imposition of financial penalties for particular 
types of complications—and financial bonuses for others.21 High quality medical 
care can be difficult to deliver consistently because of differences among patients 
that are difficult to observe. Ideally, patients would be continuously monitored 
along many dimensions, using all available information to choose the exactly 
right intervention for each patient at exactly the right time. This would allow 
caregivers to treat patients quickly and effectively while also avoiding 
unnecessary treatment. But it is a challenging goal; constant monitoring is labor 
intensive and accurate analysis requires skill and knowledge. AI can help by 
monitoring patients and predicting or quickly identifying adverse events in time 
for intervention.22 Because AI systems base their predictions on huge amounts 
of data, the underlying rationale may be opaque to human observers. Many 
health systems have begun to develop AI tools that will assist physicians in 
lowering their institutions’ rates of different types of adverse events. 
At the University of Michigan, researchers developed a predictor for the risk 
of infection with Clostridium difficile (C. diff.), a bacterium that infects 
 
19 Other scholars have applied the user innovation paradigm to a wide range 
of innovation settings, including biomedical research tools, Katherine J. 
Strandburg, Users as Innovators: Implications for Patent Doctrine, 79 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 467, 472 (2008); products for people with disabilities, Christopher 
Buccafusco, Disability and Design, 95 NYU L. REV. 952, 1007 (2020; and other 
consumer goods. See generally, e.g., William W. Fisher III, The Implications for 
Law of User Innovation, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1417 (2012). 
20 See VON HIPPEL, supra note 6, at 33. 
21 See infra text accompanying note 162. 
22 For an analysis of the translational process and a list of products in 
development, including many originating in academia, see Mark P. Sendak et 
al., A Path for Translation of Machine Learning Products into Healthcare 
Delivery, EMJ INNOVATIONS 19-00172 (2020), DOI/10.33590/emjinnov/19-00172. 
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hundreds of thousands of patients per year in health-care settings.23 C. diff. can 
be deadly or debilitating, and has become increasingly resistant to antibiotic 
treatment.24 The Michigan team used electronic health record (EHR) data from 
many thousands of patients to develop the predictive tool, which now makes 
daily predictions at Michigan Medicine to identify patients at high risk of 
infection for closer monitoring. The predictor is based on hundreds of EHR-
derived variables, some of which accord with prior clinical understanding (e.g., 
high respiratory rate) but most of which do not.25 The predictor can also be used 
to drive systematic improvements, such as isolating particularly vulnerable 
patients from the rest of the health system’s population to protect them from 
infection.  
Other health systems have developed their own C. diff. prediction tools 
trained on their own data.26 Some have tried to create one-size-fits-all models 
that work for all institutions, but have encountered difficulties based on 
differences between health systems.27 The Michigan team collaborated with 
researchers from Mass General Hospital on an intermediate approach: a 
generalizable method that can be used to develop models that fit the particular 
health systems that will use them.28 
Duke University has developed and implemented its Sepsis Watch system 
to monitor patients for sepsis. Sepsis is a serious and often fatal condition in 
which the body’s inflammatory response to an infection goes into overdrive. It 
can quickly become fatal and kills about 270,000 patients annually in the United 
States. Duke’s AI system, trained on EHR data, makes real-time predictions 
about patients’ risk of sepsis and alerts a rapid response team to intervene early 
and catch sepsis in its early stages. Notably, the system is relatively opaque 
because “[c]linical leaders . . . were willing to trade-off model interpretability for 
performance gains.”29 Researchers did not prioritize model interpretability, 
because sepsis may have many causes and treatment does not depend on which 
of those causes is present. Duke developed the system in its main hospital and 
has since rolled it out—with substantial effort and adaptation—at its two other, 
 
23 Jeeheh Oh et al., A Generalizable, Data-Driven Approach to Predict Daily 
Risk of Clostridium Difficile Infection at Two Large Academic Health Centers, 39 
INFECTION CONT. & HOSP. EPIDEMIOL. 425 (2018). 
24 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE 
THREATS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2019, at vii (2020), 
https://www.cdc.gov/drugresistance/biggest-threats.html. 
25 Benjamin Y. Li et al., Using Machine Learning and the Electronic Health 
Record to Predict Complicated Clostridium Difficile Infection, 6 OPEN F. 
INFECTIOUS DISEASE ofz186 (2019). 
26 Id. 
27 See, e.g., Xi Na et al., A Multi-Center Prospective Derivation and 
Validation of a Clinical Prediction Tool for Severe Clostridium Difficile 
Infection,10 PLOS ONE e0123405 (2015). 
28 Oh et al., supra note 23. 
29 Mark Sendak et al., Real-World Integration of a Sepsis Deep Learning 
Technology Into Routine Clinical Care: Implementation Study, 8 JMIR MED 
INFORM 1, 6 (2020). 
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smaller hospitals.30 During adoption, it was explicitly promoted to providers “as 
a home-grown solution to an important problem within the hospital,”31—though 
Duke has since licensed Cohere Med to develop the unpatented system for wider 
use in other settings.32  
Health systems are also acutely interested in patient readmission—that is, 
the likelihood that a discharged patient will be readmitted to a hospital within 
a given time frame (typically 30 days). Thirty-day readmission rate is a marker 
of care quality, and something health systems try to minimize. Readmission 
within a short time frame is a sign that something has gone wrong with the 
patient’s care: perhaps the patient’s issues were not properly resolved, or the 
patient should not have been discharged yet. Multiple health systems have 
developed their own AI-powered tools to identify patients at high risk of 
readmission to target them for intervention (for instance, assigning a nurse to 
coordinate their outpatient care). Researchers at the University of Texas 
Southwestern hospital in Dallas developed a 30-day readmission model which 
they externally validated in seven large hospitals.33 UT Southwestern has since 
spun out the model to the private firm Pieces, which now offers it as a part of its 
“Pieces Predict” commercial product.34 
As yet another example, Intermountain Healthcare has partnered with an 
external firm to develop better ways of managing their patients with chronic 
kidney disease, with the goal of reducing hospitalizations and improving 
 
30 Mark Sendak et al., “The Human Body is a Black Box”: Supporting 
Clinical Decision-Making With Deep Learning, FAT* ‘20: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
2020 CONFERENCE ON FAIRNESS, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND TRANSPARENCY 99 
(2020), https://doi.org/10.1145/3351095.3372827 (describing the development of 
Sepsis Watch as a sociotechnical system); Andrew Ng, THE BATCH (April 15, 
2020), https://blog.deeplearning.ai/blog/the-batch-ai-for-medicine-special-eric-
topols-planetary-health-system-discovering-drugs-diagnosing-heart-disease-
predicting-infections-alexa-for-doctors (noting the deployment of Sepsis Watch 
to two community hospitals). 
31 Sendak et al., supra note 29, at 8. In order to increase provider buy-in, 
“[t]hroughout the design, development, and implementation process, Sepsis 
Watch was described as a ‘tool’ to support physicians and nurses in the ED and 
the term ‘artificial intelligence’ was not used in any communication or 
presentation.” Id. at 10. 
32 Cohere Med, “Deep Sepsis” Licensed to Cohere Med, DUKE LICENSING & 
VENTURES (July 3, 2019), https://olv.duke.edu/news/deep-sepsis-licensed-to-
cohere-med/.  
33 Ruben Amarasingham et al., Electronic Medical Record-Based 
Multicondition Models to Predict the Risk of 30 Day Readmission or Death 
Among Adult Medicine Patients: Validation and Comparison to Existing Models, 
15 BMC MED. INFORMATICS DEC. MAKERS 39 (2015); Mark P. Sendak et al., A 
Path for Translation of Machine Learning Products into Healthcare Delivery, 
EMJ INNOVATIONS 19-00172 (2020), DOI/10.33590/emjinnov/19-00172. 
34 Pieces Technology, Our Products, https://piecestech.com (last visited Jan. 
29, 2021). 
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outcomes.35 Tools like these could enable health systems to provide better care 
at lower prices—while maintaining existing levels of service provision or 
reimbursement requests.36 
Second and relatedly, health systems generally seek to increase clinical 
volume and revenue where possible. Health systems therefore have incentives 
to develop AI tools that can, for example, assist physicians in completing 
procedures more quickly, or identify additional patients who would benefit from 
further services. One such example comes from Cedars-Sinai in Los Angeles,37 
which has developed an AI tool to reduce capacity strain on the system. Capacity 
strain may lead to crowded ERs, cause delays or cancellations of surgeries, result 
in unnecessary readmissions, and create provider burnout. By predicting more 
accurately the hospital’s patient census, their AI tool aims to decrease treatment 
delays, improve staff schedules (including reducing the need to pay overtime), 
and increase admissions, while avoiding overcrowding.  
Other examples focus on resource allocation and efficiency, decreasing the 
resources needed for care and, perhaps simultaneously, increasing the volume 
of care provided with existing resources. Duke is using AI to optimize bed flow—
that is, the movement of patients between different hospital units during 
different time periods after admission.38 After the COVID-19-related shutdown 
of elective surgery, Duke also turned to AI to prioritize the most important 
elective surgeries.39  
Third, all things being equal, health systems aim to reduce different types 
of costs. In particular, health systems seek to reduce back-end costs related to 
coding, billing, and transacting with third parties (such as insurers or 
regulators), as these costs do not themselves either serve a direct patient care 
mission or garner reimbursement for the hospital. They represent 
administrative frictions that cannot be eliminated entirely, but are often far 
higher in the highly-fragmented U.S. health-care system (where providers must 
develop the infrastructure to contract with and bill a variety of different 
 
35 Jessica Kent, Applying Artificial Intelligence to Chronic Disease 
Management, HEALTH IT ANALYTICS (Sept. 18, 2020), 
https://healthitanalytics.com/features/applying-artificial-intelligence-to-
chronic-disease-management.  
36 Hospitals have less incentive to reduce their costs of care if doing so will 
lower their overall reimbursement totals or profit margins. As such, these tools 
are likely to be more powerful where hospitals are operating in a managed-care 
or otherwise value-based context, rather than in a pure fee-for-service model. 
Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of Managed Care "Patient Protection" Laws: 
Incomplete Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market Failure, 85 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1, 10–13 (1999). 





38 Email conversation with Mark Sendak, Duke Institute for Health 
Innovation (June 11, 2020). 
39 Id. 
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insurers) than in other, less-fragmented health care systems.40 Some AI 
innovations assist health systems in reducing these back-end costs. One health 
system uses an AI system to analyze physician visit notes for reimbursable 
events that were not coded for reimbursement and flags those events for human 
review.41 This system not only increases revenue for already-provided care; it 
also decreases the cost of human review devoted to billing.42  
Fourth, although these health systems are businesses subject to standard 
corporate financial incentives,43 scientific curiosity plays a motivating role as 
well. Academic medical centers in particular perform clinical research in 
addition to providing patient care.44 For academic medical centers, advancing 
knowledge is a part of the institutional mission—and given the substantial grant 
funds available for biomedical research, including in the medical AI field,45 
innovation may also have financial implications. Academic medical centers have 
been at the forefront of new AI research that might be less attractive to 
commercial firms focused on the traditional financial motivations of patent-
protected commercialization and insurance reimbursement. Some of this 
research more closely resembles traditional basic research into the drivers and 
progression of certain conditions46 than it resembles the more applied 
innovations being developed for the prevention of sepsis or readmissions 
described above. Many of these initiatives are government-funded and use 
techniques of artificial intelligence and machine learning to gain greater 
understandings of particularly complex conditions, such as Alzheimer’s Disease 
or brain genomics more generally.47 
 
40 See, e.g., David U. Himmelstein et al., Health Care Administrative Costs 
in the United States and Canada, 2017, ANNALS OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 1 (2020); 
Steffie Woolhandler et al., Costs of Health Care Administration in the United 
States and Canada, 349 N. ENG. J. MED. 768 (2003); KAREN DAVIS ET AL., 
SLOWING THE GROWTH OF U.S. HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURES: WHAT ARE THE 
OPTIONS?, COMMONWEALTH FUND 4 (Jan. 2007). 
41 Interview with anonymous head of an academic medical center’s machine 
learning program (Dec. 30, 2020). 
42 Id. 
43 See, e.g., Sarah Kliff, Hospitals Knew How to Make Money. Then 
Coronavirus Happened., N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/15/us/hospitals-revenue-coronavirus.html. 
44 Of course, non-academic medical centers are also made up of health care 
providers who may be individually motivated by genuine scientific and medical 
curiosity. 
45 See, e.g., National Institute of Biomedical Imaging and Bioengineering, 
Research Funding: Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, and Deep Learning 
(last updated 2020), https://www.nibib.nih.gov/research-funding/machine-
learning; Amarnath R. Annapureddy et al., The National Institutes of Health 
Funding for Clinical Research Applying Machine Learning Techniques in 2017, 
3 NPJ DIGITAL MED. 1 (2020). 
46 See W. Nicholson Price II, Grants, 34 BERK. TECH. L.J. 1 (2019). 
47 See, e.g., Xi Luo, Large-Scale Network Modeling for Brain Dynamics: 
Statistical Learning and Optimization, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH 
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The smaller role of the traditional innovation policy levers discussed in Part 
III may if anything make it easier for health systems to engage in this broad 
range of AI innovation. Health systems seeking to develop AI technologies can 
do so with far less financial investment than companies developing traditional 
medical products, for several reasons: rather than paying for costly data 
collection through clinical trials, they can repurpose data that they have already 
created in the form of healthcare records of clinical care, and they are much less 
likely to go through a costly FDA review process for their AI technologies. As a 
result of these lower development costs, health systems may not need 
substantial, standalone reimbursements for these innovations and can instead 
recoup their investments by reducing costs, by increasing volumes, or by 
improving quality metrics. In other cases, health systems are covering their 
investment expenses by obtaining grants or prize awards (most notably but not 
only from the federal government).48 In still other situations, as noted above, 
health systems may develop these AI tools in collaboration with outside firms, 
contributing their valuable patient health data for the company’s use.49 Patent 
protection may be less important for these AI technologies because of the 
difficulty for competitors of reproducing technologies that rely on access to 
confidential data sets and use opaque algorithms.50 
 
B.  Insurers 
 
Health insurers have also been longtime stakeholders in the delivery and 
coverage of health care services. Insurers themselves are a varied group with 
diverging interests. Even putting aside the role of the federal government as an 
insurer, providing coverage for more than 100 million Americans through 
Medicare and Medicaid alone,51 private insurers play a range of different roles 
in health care delivery and coverage. Insurance companies may provide 
insurance for businesses that offer health benefits to their employees, or may 
 
REPORT (2019), https://projectreporter.nih.gov/project_info_
description.cfm?aid=9899033&icde=0; Li Shen, Integrative Bioinformatics 
Approaches to Human Brain Genomics and Connectomics, NATIONAL INSTITUTES 
OF HEALTH REPORT (2019), https://projectreporter.nih.gov/project_info_
description.cfm?aid=9694688. 
48 See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., AI Health Outcomes Challenge 
(2019), https://ai.cms.gov/ (listing Geisinger, Jefferson Health, Mayo Clinic, 
Northwestern, UVA as health systems receiving awards). 
49 See I. Glenn Cohen & Michelle M. Mello, Big Data, Big Tech, and 
Protecting Patient Privacy, 322 J AM. MED. ASS’N 1141 (2019); Kayte Spector-
Bagdady et al., Sharing Health Data and Biospecimens with Industry – A 
Principle-Driven, Practical Approach, 382 N. ENG. J. MED. 2072 (2020). 
50 See Price, supra note 2 , at 434. 
51 See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., FISCAL YEAR 2016 JUSTIFICATION OF ESTIMATES FOR 
APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES 109 (2015), https://www.cms.gov/About-
CMS/Agency -Information/PerformanceBudget/Downloads/FY2016-CJ-
Final.pdf. 
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serve as third-party administrators that process insurance claims for employers 
who self-insure coverage for their employees.52 Insurance companies may offer 
fee-for-service plans, reimbursing providers for each service they provide, or 
they may use a managed care model, requiring providers to work within more 
tightly specified budgets.53 Private insurance firms even play a large role in the 
deployment of the Medicare and Medicaid programs, as 22 million seniors now 
purchase privately-run Medicare Advantage plans54 and 54 million Medicaid 
enrollees have their coverage provided by comprehensive Managed Care 
Organizations, through private insurers.55  
In general, however, insurers have not featured prominently in discussions 
of the process of innovation into new health care technologies.56 But the role of 
insurers has changed for new AI technologies. Like the hospitals and health 
systems described above, insurers’ incentives to reduce care costs and increase 
efficiency have driven them to invest in the development of certain types of new 
AI products. In this way, insurers can also be understood as user innovators, 
seeking to develop customized products for use in their own operations.57  
Insurers have financial motivations to reduce care costs. If an insurer has 
budgeted a particular amount of money for the care of each beneficiary each 
year, the cost of care that exceeds that projected budget will often be borne by 
the insurer, not by an employer or by the patient. Insurers thus have incentives 
to discourage patients from seeking unnecessary care, where possible. For 
example, an insurer might prefer that a patient see a primary care doctor or visit 
an urgent care clinic for non-emergency care, rather than going to a (more 
 
52 Erin C. Fuse Brown, Consumer Financial Protection in Health Care, 95 
WASH. U.L. REV. 127, 188 (2017). 
53 Korobkin, supra note 36, at 10, 12–13. 
54 Gretchen Jacobson et al., A Dozen Facts About Medicare Advantage in 
2019, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION (June 6, 2019), 
https://www.kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/a-dozen-facts-about-medicare-
advantage-in-2019/. 
55 Elizabeth Hinton et al., 10 Things to Know About Medicaid Managed Care, 
KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION (Dec. 16, 2019), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-
brief/10-things-to-know-about-medicaid-managed-care/. 
56 Although as discussed infra in Part III.C, a growing body of scholarship 
has started to address the role that insurers and reimbursement may play in the 
health innovation space. See, e.g., Sachs, supra note 8 (describing insurance 
reimbursement incentives for insurers); Mark A. Lemley, Lisa Larrimore 
Ouellette, & Rachel E. Sachs, The Medicare Innovation Subsidy, 95 NYU L. REV. 
75 (2020) (describing how Medicare reimbursement creates subsidies for 
particular types of biomedical innovation); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Shifting 
Institutional Roles in Biomedical Innovation in a Learning Healthcare System, 
14 J. INST. ECON. 1139 (2018) (describing the new role of insurers in innovation); 
Rebecca S. Eisenberg & W. Nicholson Price II, Promoting Healthcare Innovation 
on the Demand Side, 4 J. L. & BIOSCIENCES 3 (2017) (describing innovation by 
insurers themselves). 
57 Eisenberg, supra, at 1141. 
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expensive) emergency room.58 Many insurers have developed non-AI initiatives 
designed to help patients figure out what type of care might be right for them, 
such as providing 24-hour triage nurse lines.59  
Insurers are also working on AI-based products that help both doctors and 
patients make triage decisions. Highmark, affiliated with Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield, aims to use AI tools both to prevent the onset of chronic conditions and 
to treat them more effectively.60 Highmark’s recent development partnership 
with Google Cloud will allow Highmark to contribute its patient data to the 
collaboration, with the goal of benefiting from Google Cloud’s AI expertise.61 
Importantly, at least some of these AI tools—such as one developed by Optum, 
a division of UnitedHealth, which also aims to better manage patients with 
chronic conditions—have resulted in disturbing racially disparate impacts on 
patients,62 a topic to which we return in Part V.  
Closely related to reducing the costs of care, insurers are motivated to 
increase efficiency in the reimbursement process. Just as hospitals and health 
systems must develop the infrastructure to contract with and bill many different 
insurers for the care they provide to their patients, insurers must develop the 
infrastructure to work with many different health care providers and to manage 
the claim review process. Insurers are working to develop AI-based technologies 
 
58 At least one large insurance company, Anthem, has developed a policy of 
denying coverage for emergency room visits that it later deems to have been 
“unnecessary.” This policy has come under strong criticism, as patients 
themselves do not always know whether a hospital visit is “necessary” when 
symptoms are concerning. See, e.g., Sarah Kliff, An ER Visit, a $12,000 Bill – 
And a Health Insurer That Wouldn’t Pay, VOX (Jan. 29, 2018), 
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/1/29/16906558/anthem-
emergency-room-coverage-denials-inappropriate; Samantha Raphelson, 
Anthem Policy Discouraging “Avoidable” Emergency Room Visits Faces 
Criticism, NPR (May 23, 2018), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/05/23/613649094/anthem-policy-discouraging-
avoidable-emergency-room-visits-faces-criticism. 
59 See, e.g., Bruce Japsen, Health Insurers Hire Thousands of Nurses to 
Coordinate Care, FORBES (Sept. 25, 2015), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/brucejapsen/2015/09/25/health-insurers-hire-
thousands-of-nurses-amid-shift-to-value-based-care/#51531d96d9d7. 
60 Jim Molis, AI Tools Improves Care to Patients With Chronic Conditions – 
and Savings for Insurers and Employers, PITTSBURGH BUSINESS TIMES (May 1, 
2020), https://www.bizjournals.com/pittsburgh/news/2020/05/01/ai-tools-
improves-care-to-patients-with-chronic.html.  
61 Highmark Health, Highmark Health Partners with Google Cloud to Raise 
Standard for Customer and Clinician Engagement in Health (Dec. 17, 2020), 
https://www.highmarkhealth.org/hmk/newsroom/pr/2020/2020-12-17-Living-
Health.shtml.  
62 Ziad Obermeyer et al., Dissecting Racial Bias in an Algorithm Used to 
Manage the Health of Populations, 366 SCIENCE 447, 447 (2019); Quinn 
Gawronski, Racial Bias Found in Widely Used Health Care Algorithm, NBC 
NEWS (Nov. 6, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/racial-bias-found-
widely-used-health-care-algorithm-n1076436.  
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for reducing the administrative costs and frictions of these interactions. For 
example, Optum has also developed AI models to help review provider claims.63 
 
C.  Venture Capital Investments 
 
In addition to developing AI tools either in-house or in partnerships with 
external firms, both health systems and insurers are also developing additional 
ways in which they can fund outside innovators.64 At least some of these VC-
funded efforts are designed to produce novel AI-based technologies. Many of 
them also fall into the above categories—for instance, Cigna Ventures has 
invested in a company using AI to target precision medicine efforts, aiming to 
target treatments to particular patients.65 UnitedHealth’s Optum Ventures has 
devoted a portion of its $600 million venture fund to Mindstrong Health,66 which 
seeks to deliver mental health care virtually in a way that functions to “lower[] 
the inpatient readmission rate” and “ER admission rate.”67  
Health systems also fund innovations that come directly from their own 
internal work, but which may need further external development. Several of 
these funds are sponsored by large, well-known health systems—such as the 
Mayo Clinic68 or Cleveland Clinic69—but many smaller health systems have 
funds as well. Providence Ventures, the venture capital fund of Seattle-based 
 
63 Tom Davenport & Randy Bean, Optum Focuses on AI to Improve 
Administrative Decisions, FORBES (Oct. 9, 2020), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomdavenport/2020/10/09/optum-focuses-on-ai-to-
improve-administrative-decisions/?sh=4c0408086dad.  
64 The named insurers are not the only ones to have developed venture funds. 
For instance, BlueCross BlueShield has also developed a Venture Fund. See Blue 
Cross and Blue Shield Association, Blue Venture Fund (last visited June 5, 
2020), https://blueventurefund.com/. BCBS has also engaged in novel innovation 
challenges, such as its Data Innovation Challenge which rewarded the winning 
firms (of over 130 applicants) not with money, but with access to patient data. 
BlueCross BlueShield Association, Thrive Earlier Detection Wins the BlueCross 
BlueShield Data Innovation Challenge (2019), https://www.bcbs.com/bluecross-
blueshield-data-innovation-challenge.  
65 Tracey Walker, Cigna Leverages AI, MANAGED HEALTHCARE EXECUTIVE 
(July 15, 2019), https://www.managedhealthcareexecutive.com/article/cigna-
leverages-ai. 
66 Christopher Snowbeck, Optum Ventures Backs Startup That Uses AI To 
Aid in Medical Diagnosis, STAR TRIBUNE (Sept. 26, 2018), 
https://www.startribune.com/optum-ventures-backs-startup-that-uses-ai-to-
aid-in-medical-diagnosis/494377661/?refresh=true. 
67 Mindstrong Health, About Us (last visited Jan. 28, 2021), 
https://mindstrong.com/about-us/. 
68 Mayo Clinic Ventures, Business Development (2021), 
http://ventures.mayoclinic.org/business-development.php. 
69 The Rise of Hospital-Backed Venture Capital Funds, BECKER’S HOSPITAL 
REVIEW (Oct. 15, 2014), https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/healthcare-
information-technology/the-rise-of-hospital-backed-venture-capital-funds.html. 
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Providence Health & Services, plans to invest $150 million in new IT products 
“designed to improve care coordination, patient engagement, data analytics” and 
other priorities.70 
Because these innovators are working to meet their own needs rather than 
to sell to a commercial market, they respond differently to the set of legal levers 
that policymakers often use to encourage innovation—a subject to which we now 
turn. These innovators are relatively undeterred by the uncertainty of patent 
protection for their innovations, and because they are not selling a product they 
have no need to reassure purchasers that the high price of their innovations will 
be covered by insurance. At the same time, in some cases these AI innovators 
may not need to complete the lengthy, risky FDA review process before putting 
their products to use, making the costs of developing these AI products far lower 
than the costs of developing conventional therapeutic products for commercial 
sale. These altered dynamics help explain both why different innovation 
stakeholders have emerged as the prime movers in medical AI innovation and 
also how those stakeholders’ incentives are shaped.  
 
 
III. DIMINISHED LEGAL REGIMES: QUALITY OVERSIGHT AND 
INCENTIVES 
 
Three major legal regimes that shape biomedical innovation are less robust 
in the context of these new AI technologies than they are for other biomedical 
innovation. Most of these AI tools are subject to substantially less rigorous FDA 
scrutiny than are traditional new prescription drugs or medical devices, either 
as a matter of statutory constraint or as a matter of FDA’s enforcement 
discretion. Patent incentives are less reliable for several reasons, including 
limitations on patent eligible subject matter under U.S. law and difficulties 
complying with patent law disclosure requirements for algorithms that are 
opaque and constantly changing. Patents may also be less important because of 
the effectiveness of trade secrecy for these innovations. And because most of the 
AI technologies involved are not reimbursable by insurers, insurance coverage 
determinations fail to supply either direct incentives or an independent source 
of quality oversight. The relative weakness of these regimes on one hand reduces 
legal incentives for development of these AI technologies, but on the other hand 
reduces barriers to entry. At the same time, the weakness of these regimes limits 
the levers available to policymakers seeking to shape the development of this 
burgeoning set of AI tools. Other mechanisms are available—grants or prizes 
could drive development, and tort law or state medical boards could provide 
oversight—but the traditional policy levers are harder to pull. 
 
 
A.  FDA regulation 
 
FDA performs a critical technology oversight role under the Food, Drug & 
 
70 Id. 
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Cosmetic Act (FDCA)71 before many new biomedical technologies may be 
introduced in commerce. Although regulation adds to the costs of developing 
these products, it also promotes innovation in at least two ways. First, by 
demanding that data from clinical trials of new products be collected and 
submitted to FDA as a condition for premarket approval or clearance, regulation 
motivates innovating firms to invest in a costly and socially valuable form of 
R&D. Second, by imposing regulatory entry barriers on other firms before they 
can market competing versions of successful new technologies, regulation gives 
innovators a head start before they face price-lowering competition.72 
The landscape appears to be quite different for many technologies described 
in this Article. Health systems and insurers are routinely developing and 
implementing AI systems that shift the way care is provided, whether directly 
or indirectly, without seeking FDA clearance or approval—indeed, as of this 
writing, no FDA cleared or approved AI devices were sponsored by health 
systems, hospitals, academic medical centers, or insurers.73 And yet such user 
innovators regularly deploy their own AI-based systems, as described above. 
What explains this difference?  
Leaving aside the possibility that some innovators may be flouting FDA’s 
requirements, there are several good reasons that the agency keeps a lower 
profile here. Some of the technologies considered in this paper are likely beyond 
the reach of FDA’s regulatory authority. Others may be within FDA’s authority, 
but it may decline to regulate them as a matter of enforcement discretion 
because of its current perception that they do not present much risk to patients. 
To be clear, FDA is actively reevaluating its regulatory approach to AI and 
machine learning functions that are intended for use in the care, mitigation, 
treatment, or prevention of disease, leaving some uncertainty as to what future 
regulation will look like. We do not mean to suggest that the agency is absent—
even where it leaves unregulated spaces, the limits of those spaces shape the 
actions of health systems and insurers in developing the technologies noted 
above. Nevertheless, the overall picture is one of lower regulatory hurdles for 
medical AI, particularly when it is developed and deployed by user innovators. 
 
1. The limits of FDA’s regulatory authority 
 
FDA has never had comprehensive authority to regulate all new medical 
technologies, and much biomedical innovation has routinely happened in the 
course of activities that are beyond FDA’s reach. By long tradition, FDA does not 
regulate the practice of medicine, including innovative new uses by physicians 
of products that were previously approved or cleared as safe and effective for 
 
71 Pub. L. No. 75-717 (1938) (codified as amended in provisions set forth in 
Title 21 of the U.S. Code). 
72 See Eisenberg, supra note 8. 
73 The Medical Futurist, FDA-Approved A.I.-Based Algorithms, 
https://medicalfuturist.com/fda-approved-ai-based-algorithms/ (last visited 
January 23, 2021). 













Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2021
20 NEW INNOVATION MODELS IN MEDICAL AI 
  
other purposes.74 Health-care providers have always played an important role 
in biomedical innovation as they learn by doing,75 giving critical feedback and 
suggestions for improvements to firms that develop regulated products as well 
as continuously improving unregulated technologies such as surgical 
techniques.76 
Another important limitation is that the FDCA only applies to products that 
are introduced, delivered, or received in interstate commerce.77 Many of the 
technologies that we consider in this paper are developed and used within 
institutions like health systems that do not sell them to others or otherwise 
make them available in commerce. As a result, information technology products 
developed within a health-care institution without the use of components 
derived from commerce, and used only internally to analyze the institution’s own 
data, might be beyond the constitutional and statutory limits of FDA 
regulation—lawyers have certainly made this argument regarding the FDA’s 
authority to regulate laboratory-developed diagnostic tests, which are also 
developed and deployed within a particular health-care institution.78 However, 
courts have also upheld the FDA’s exercise of its jurisdiction in similar 
circumstances.79 
FDA’s authority is also limited because not all of the AI technologies 
 
74 See 21 U.S.C. § 396 (“Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to limit 
or interfere with the authority of a health care practitioner to prescribe or 
administer any legally marketed device to a patient for any condition or disease 
within a legitimate health care practitioner-patient relationship relationship.”); 
Wendy Teo, FDA and the Practice of Medicine: Looking at Off-Label Drugs, 41 
SETON HALL LEG. J. 305 (2017). But see Patricia J. Zettler, Toward Coherent 
Federal Oversight of Medicine, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 427 (2015) (arguing the 
distinction between medical products and the practice of medicine is indistinct). 
75 Richard R. Nelson et al., How Medical Know-How Progresses, 40 
RESEARCH POLICY 1339 (2011). 
76 See Annetine Gelijns & Nathan Rosenberg, The Dynamics of Technological 
Change in Medicine, 13 HEALTH AFFAIRS 28 (1994). 
77 21 U.S.C. § 331; see also 21 U.S.C. § 321(b) (“The term “interstate 
commerce means (1) commerce between any State or Territory and any place 
outside thereof, and (2) commerce within the District of Columbia or within any 
other Territory not organized with a legislative body.”) Although health and 
safety regulation is traditionally relegated to the states, the limitation of 
prohibited activities to interstate commerce gave Congress authority to enact 
the legislation under Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 3 of the Constitution (“The Congress shall 
have Power … To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the 
several States ….”). 
78 PAUL D. CLEMENT & LAURENCE H. TRIBE, LABORATORY TESTING SERVICES, 
AS THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE, CANNOT BE REGULATED AS MEDICAL DEVICES 10 
(2015), https://www.acla.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Tribe-Clement-
White-Paper-1-6-15.pdf.  
79 U.S. v. Regenerative Sciences, 741 F.3d 1314, 1320 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
(affirming jurisdiction of FDA to enforce FDCA against medical practice that 
treated patients with a mixture of mesenchymal stem cells extracted from the 
patients with an antibiotic that had been shipped in interstate commerce). 
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considered in this paper are likely to fit within the broad statutory definition of 
“device”:  
 
“an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, 
in vitro reagent, or other similar or related article, including any component, 
part, or accessory, which is … (2) intended for use in the diagnosis of disease 
or other conditions, or in the care, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of 
disease in man or other animals ….”80 
 
This definition, which covers a broad range of health-care products from 
simple bandages and tongue depressors to complex cardiac pacemakers,81 
nonetheless seems to exclude software to improve the efficiency of health system 
staffing operations. On the other hand, an algorithm that predicts which 
patients are at heightened risk of developing a C. diff. infection and selects some 
patients for closer monitoring seems clearly to be “intended for use … in the care, 
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man.”  
Congress further limited the definition of device in the 21st Century Cures 
Act (Cures Act),82 to exclude five specified “software functions,”83 while generally 
preserving FDA’s traditional authority to regulate products intended for use in 
the diagnosis, treatment, or prevention of disease.84 Some of the functions 
 
80 21 U.S.C. § 321(h). In 2016 Congress added an explicit exclusion for 
“software functions excluded pursuant to section 360j(o).” Id. at § 321(h)(3). 
81 The statute further divides this broad category into different classes with 
increasing regulatory controls based on the degree of risk they pose. 21 U.S.C. § 
360c. Other statutory language includes in the definition of “device” an article 
which is “(1) recognized in the official National Formulary, or the United States 
Pharmacopeia, or any supplement to them,” or “(3) intended to affect the 
structure or any function of the body of man or other animals.” 21 U.S.C. § 
321(h). The AI technologies considered in this paper are unlikely to meet either 
of these alternative prongs of the device definition. 
82 Pub. L. 114-255 (2016). 
83 Id. § 3060(a), codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360j(o). Congress also amended the 
statutory definition of “device” to cross-reference these exclusions. See supra 
note 80. 
84 As amended, the statute excludes from the definition of device a software 
function that is intended 
(A) for administrative support of a health care facility …; (B) for 
maintaining or encouraging a healthy lifestyle …; (C) to serve as 
electronic patient records … so long as – (i) such records were created, 
stored, transferred, or reviewed by health care professionals, or by 
individuals working under supervision of such professionals …; (D) for 
transferring, storing, converting formats, or displaying clinical 
laboratory test or other device data and results … unless such function 
is intended to interpret or analyze clinical laboratory test or other device 
data, results, and findings; or (E) … for the purpose of (i) displaying, 
analyzing, or printing medical information about a patient or other 
medical information …; (ii) supporting or providing recommendations to 
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recited in these exclusions, such as “administrative support of a health-care 
facility,” would not likely have been regulated as medical devices even prior to 
the Cures Act because they fall outside the intended use limitation in the 
statute.85 Others, such as maintaining or encouraging a healthy lifestyle, involve 
functions of low enough risk that FDA had previously indicated it would decline 
to regulate them as a matter of enforcement discretion.86 Although these 
functions are now presumptively excluded from the statutory definition of 
device, Congress gave FDA authority to regulate them as devices if it makes a 
finding “that such software function would be reasonably likely to have serious 
adverse health consequences.”87 
Two exclusions, described in subsections (D) and (E) of the Cures Act 
software provisions, potentially curtail regulation of traditional software that 
might otherwise have been covered by the broad statutory definition of device, 
but they generally leave intact regulatory authority over more complex medical 
AI. Subsection (D) excludes software functions that transfer, store, convert 
formats, or display data, “unless such function is intended to interpret or 
analyze” the data, in which case it remains subject to regulation as a medical 
device.88 Under FDA’s interpretation, this provision allows FDA to regulate 
software that allocates health system resources to those patients with the most 
urgent needs: 
 
For example, if a software function is intended to prioritize patients 
in an Intensive Care Unit based on their clinical status, then this 
function is intended to interpret or analyze device data, results and 
findings and is, therefore, not excluded from the definition of device….89 
 
a health care professional about prevention, diagnosis, or treatment of a 
disease or condition; and (iii) enabling such health care professional to 
independently review the basis for such recommendations that such 
software presents … 
Pub. L. 114-255 § 3060(a) (2016), codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360j(o). 
85 See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
86 See, e.g., U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Changes to Existing Medical Software 
Policies Resulting from Section 3060 of the 21st Century Cures Act: Guidance for 
Industry and Food and Drug Admin. Staff at 6–7 (2019) (hereinafter Cures Act 
Changes Guidance) (previous guidance indicating that FDA intended to exercise 
enforcement discretion to refrain from regulating certain medical mobile 
applications designed to promote general fitness and wellness for individuals 
would be modified to indicate that these applications no longer meet the 
definition of “device”); id at 8–11 (previous guidance indicating that FDA 
intended to exercise enforcement discretion for software functions that enable 
individuals to interact with their own electronic health records would be 
modified to indicate that these functions no longer meet the definition of 
“device”). 
87 21 U.S.C. § 360j(o)(3)(A). Notification of the finding and proposed order 
must be published in the Federal Register with an opportunity for public 
comment for at least 30 days before it becomes final. Id. at § 360j(o)(3)(B). 
88 21 U.S.C. § 360j(o)(3)(D). 
89 Cures Act Changes Guidance, supra note 86, at 13. 
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Many forms of AI technology described in this article would seem to remain 
regulable under this interpretation.  
Subsection (E) provides a potentially broader exclusion for clinical decision 
support (CDS) software for the use of health-care professionals, but it appears 
not to apply to opaque recommendations derived from complex AI algorithms.90 
This exclusion covers some software functions that analyze data and that 
provide recommendations to a health care professional about prevention, 
diagnosis, or treatment of a disease or condition,91 but only if it is intended to be 
sufficiently transparent to enable a health care professional “to independently 
review the basis for such recommendations … so that it is not the intent that 
such health care professional rely primarily on any of such recommendations to 
make a clinical diagnosis or treatment decision regarding an individual 
patient.”92 As FDA explains in recent draft guidance, this criterion requires 
disclosure of underlying data and the logic or rationale used by an algorithm in 
making a recommendation to qualify for exclusion: 
 
In order to describe the basis for a recommendation, regardless of the 
complexity of the software and whether or not it is proprietary, the software 
developer should describe the underlying data used to develop the algorithm 
and should include plain language descriptions of the logic or rationale used 
by an algorithm to render a recommendation. … A practitioner would be 
unable to independently evaluate the basis of a recommendation, and 
therefore would be primarily relying upon it, if the recommendation were 
based on information whose meaning could not be expected to be 
independently understood by the intended HCP user (e.g., the inputs used 
to generate the recommendation are not identified).93 
 
At least some health-care systems are working to align their AI products 
with this criterion to avoid regulation. In the case of Sepsis Watch, discussed 
supra in Part II, “Clinicians were instructed to put the model output into context 
with other relevant information to confirm or dismiss a sepsis diagnosis. The 
machine learning model did not drive clinical care in a standalone manner.”94 
 
90 21 U.S.C. § 360j(o)(1)(E). FDA draft guidance explains: 
“Products that acquire an image or physiological signal from the 
body, or from a sample from the body, or that process or analyze such 
information, or both, have been regulated for many years as devices 
when such acquisition, processing, or analyzing is intended for a purpose 
identified in the statutory device definition.” 
U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Clinical Decision Support Software: Draft 
Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug Admin. Staff, at 9 (2019) (hereinafter 
“CDS Draft Guidance”). 
91 21 U.S.C. §§ 360j(o)(1)(E)(i), (ii). 
92 Id. at § 360j(o)(1)(E)(iii). 
93 U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Clinical Decision Support Software: Draft 
Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug Admin. Staff, at 12 (2019) 
(hereinafter “CDS Draft Guidance”). 
94 Sendak et al., supra note 29, at 6. 
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The developers behind the tool reported that they “worked closely with 
regulatory officials to ensure that Sepsis Watch qualified as CDS and was not a 
diagnostic medical device.”95 
Commentators have criticized this statutory criterion and FDA’s 
interpretations.96 The criterion may be difficult or impossible to satisfy for 
sophisticated AI software that continuously learns from new data and makes 
recommendations based on ever-changing algorithms that are opaque to users. 
Even when transparency is technically possible, it may require disclosure of 
valuable proprietary data and algorithms, thus forcing innovators to choose 
between avoiding regulation and preserving trade secrecy. 
 
2. Enforcement discretion and its limits 
 
In addition to statutory limits on what FDA can regulate, FDA sometimes 
exercises discretion to relieve innovators from the burdens of regulation for 
relatively small-scale activities. For example, when Congress gave FDA 
authority to regulate in vitro diagnostic devices as medical devices in the 
Medical Device Amendments of 1976,97 FDA exercised discretion to refrain from 
enforcement for laboratory developed tests (LDTs) that are designed, 
manufactured and used within a single laboratory.98 Initially these laboratories 
were small and local, but as the industry and technology evolved, the entities 
taking advantage of enforcement discretion became larger and provided testing 
services on a national and even international scale.99 Eventually FDA issued 
draft guidance proposing to exercise greater oversight of some LDTs under a 
risk-based approach that would increase oversight as necessary to protect 
patient safety.100 Feedback from industry led FDA to decide against issuing final 
guidance for the regulation of LDTs in the final days of the Obama 
Administration101 (though the laboratories themselves remain subject to 
regulation by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) under a 
different statue102). But the absence of binding guidance does not compel FDA to 
 
95 Id. 
96 See, e.g., Barbara J. Evans & Pilar Ossorio, The Challenge of Regulating 
Clinical Decision Support Software After 21st Century Cures, 44 AM. J.L. MED. 
244–50 (2018); Efthimios Parasidis, Clinical Decision Support: Elements of a 
Sensible Legal Framework, 20 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL. 183, 191–208 (2019). 
97 Pub. L. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (1976). 
98 U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Draft Guidance for Industry, Food and Drug 
Administration Staff, and Clinical Laboratories, Framework for Regulatory 
Oversight of Laboratory Developed Tests (LDTs), at 5–7 (Oct. 2014). 
99 Id. at 7–8. 
100 Id. 
101 U.S.Food & Drug Admin., Discussion Paper on Laboratory Developed 
Tests (LDTs) (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/media/102367/download/ 
(hereinafter “Discussion LDTs”).  
102 CMS administers the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments 
(CLIA), and clinical laboratories must obtain certificates of compliance or 
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continue a policy of enforcement discretion. Meanwhile, some laboratories have 
sought premarket approval or clearance for LDTs, perhaps to signal quality or 
to secure insurance coverage for their tests.103  
FDA recognized the complex effects of enforcement discretion on innovation 
in summing up the competing views expressed in reactions to its Draft Guidance 
on LDTs: 
 
While excessive oversight can discourage innovation, inadequate and 
inconsistent oversight in which different test developers are treated 
differently can also discourage innovation by making it difficult for high-
quality test developers to compete with poorer counterparts…. When 
patients and providers discover that results they relied upon to make 
treatment and/or diagnostic decisions were inaccurate, their confidence in 
laboratory testing may be compromised… Appropriately tailored oversight 
can facilitate the development of analytically and clinically valid tests and 
the generation of the evidence health care providers and patients need to 
make well-informed decisions.104 
 
Similar competing considerations inform FDA’s contemplation of how to 
regulate AI functions. A challenge for regulating AI and machine learning 
systems under FDA’s current authorities is that unless the technology is “locked” 
prior to marketing so that the algorithm will always provide the same result in 
response to the same input—an approach with its own risks105—the algorithm 
 
accreditation under CLIA in order to receive Medicare and Medicaid 
reimbursement for the testing services they provide. Ctr. for Medicare & 
Medicaid Servs., CLIA, https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-
Guidance/Legislation/CLIA. CLIA primarily regulates laboratories and their 
procedures, requiring labs to “meet requirements relating to the proper 
collection, transportation, and storage of specimens,” 42 U.S.C. § 263a(f)(1)(B), 
and to “use only personnel meeting such qualifications as the Secretary may 
establish,” id. at § 263a(f)(1)(C), among other things. But CLIA regulations do 
impose some requirements on the analytical validity of tests themselves, by 
requiring laboratories to engage in proficiency testing and to set specifications 
for their tests’ accuracy, precision, and reportable ranges. 42 C.F.R. § 
493.1253(b). See also Rachel E. Sachs, Innovation Law and Policy: Preserving 
the Future of Personalized Medicine, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1881, 1891–94 
(2016). 
103 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Opting Into Device Regulation in the Face of 
Uncertain Patentability, 23 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY L. REV. (2019). 
Laboratories performing diagnostic testing for COVID-19 may want their LDTs 
to receive FDA authorization, which allows those firms to receive legal immunity 
under emergency preparedness laws. Steve Usdin, FDA to Stop Reviewing 
COVID-19 Lab Tests, Raising Concerns in Congress, BIOCENTURY (Oct. 7, 2020), 
https://www.biocentury.com/article/630971/fda-to-stop-reviewing-covid-19-lab-
tests-raising-concerns-in-congress.  
104 See Discussion LDTs, supra note 101, at 1-2. 
105 While locked algorithms provide the same outputs given the same input, 
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will continue to change as it continues to learn from new data generated in the 
course of further experience.106 This feature makes premarket regulation 
problematic as a mechanism for quality oversight. At what point in the lifecycle 
of a continuously changing algorithm is it time for further regulatory review?  
FDA has proposed for discussion a “total product lifecycle” regulatory 
approach to regulation—which may require additional statutory authority—
that relies heavily on manufacturer vigilance and best practices to provide 
reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness of products that change over 
time.107 FDA has worked with regulators in other countries under the auspices 
of the International Medical Device Regulators Forum (IMDRF) to develop this 
approach and to harmonize expectations for the regulatory treatment of these 
technologies in order to promote patient safety while fostering innovation.108 As 
envisioned, regulators or third party evaluators would assess the culture of 
quality and organizational excellence of a particular company in a 
precertification program to ensure that manufacturers will monitor their devices 
to continually manage patient risks throughout the product lifecycle.109 FDA 
would conduct premarket review for those devices that require it, establish clear 
expectations for manufacturers to continually manage patient risks throughout 
the product lifecycle, and require ongoing postmarket performance reporting 
and transparency.110 Product changes that change the intended use would 
require a new premarket submission.111 Although the plan has not yet been 
finalized, FDA reaffirmed its approach in January 2021.112 
By reducing the regulatory burden on incremental product changes, this 
 
inputs change as the real world does, which can degrade algorithm performance 
over time. Sharon E. Davis et al., Calibration Drift in Regression and Machine 
Learning Models for Acute Kidney Injury, 24 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 
1052, 1053 (2017). 
106 See U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Proposed Regulatory Framework for 
Modifications to Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning (AI/ML)-Based 
Software as a Medical Device (SaMD): Discussion Paper and Request for 
Feedback (2019) (hereinafter “Proposed Framework for Modifications”). 
107 Id. at 7-14. 
108 See Int’l Med. Device Regulator’s Forum, Software as a Medical Device 
(SaMD): Key Definitions (2013), 
http://www.imdrf.org/docs/imdrf/final/technical/imdrf-tech-131209-samd-key-
definitions-140901.pdf; U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Software as a Medical Device 
(SAMD): Clinical Evaluation, Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug Admin. 
Staff (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/search-fda-
guidance-documents/software-medical-device-samd-clinical-evaluation. 
109 U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Developing a Software Precertification 
Program: A Working Model; v.1 (Jan. 2019), 
https://www.fda.gov/media/119722/download; see also Rachel E. Sachs, 
Regulating Intermediate Technologies, 37 Yale J. Reg. 219, 248 (2020). 
110 Proposed Framework for Modifications, supra note 106, at 12-15. 
111 Id. at 11-12.  
112 FDA, FDA Releases Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning Action Plan, 
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-releases-artificial-
intelligencemachine-learning-action-plan (Jan. 12, 2021). 
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approach would permit software firms to perform their own quality oversight as 
they continually update their products. But the focus on company culture may 
offer less relief to new AI user innovators such as health systems and insurers 
that do not have a history of exercising quality oversight over software products. 
 
3. Implications for Medical AI 
 
The regulatory implications for the technologies considered in this article 
are mixed. Some software functions—including “back office” administrative 
tasks such as billing and insurance reimbursement, general wellness and 
healthy lifestyle support, and electronic health records—may be categorically 
excluded from regulation as devices, although the boundaries of the excluded 
categories may be blurry enough to encourage prior consultation with FDA to be 
sure. Even for categorically excluded software functions, the Cures Act gives 
FDA authority to override the exclusion by finding that it is “reasonably likely 
to have serious adverse health consequences.”113  
AI technologies that pertain more directly to diagnosis and treatment of 
patients will likely continue to meet the statutory definition of devices, although 
FDA might choose to regulate them with a light touch. The FDCA gives FDA 
considerable flexibility to classify medical devices into three different risk 
categories with different levels of regulatory controls.114 FDA may also exercise 
enforcement discretion rather than exercising its full authority to regulate some 
devices that it believes pose low risk to the public.115 For example, FDA recently 
stated in draft guidance that it does not intend to enforce compliance with the 
applicable device requirements of the FDCA for CDS functions intended to 
inform clinical management for non-serious situations or conditions, even when 
health care providers are unable to independently review the basis for the 
recommendation.116 Discretionary forbearance from regulation under 
 
113 21 U.S.C. § 360j(o)(3). 
114 21 U.S.C. § 360c. Class I devices pose the lowest risk and are subject to 
the lowest level of regulatory controls, with increasing levels of regulatory 
controls for the higher risk devices in Class II and Class III. U.S. Food & Drug 
Admin., Overview of Device Regulation (Aug. 31 2018), 
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/device-advice-comprehensive-regulatory-
assistance/overview-device-regulation. 
115 E.g., CDS Draft Guidance, supra note 90, at 16 (indicating when FDA 
intends to exercise enforcement discretion for low-risk software functions 
intended to provide clinical decision support). See also U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 
Policy for Device Software Functions and Mobile Medical Applications, Guidance 
for Industry and Food and Drug Admin. Staff 2 (Sept. 27, 2019) (“[T]he FDA 
intends to apply its regulatory oversight to only those software functions that 
are medical devices and whose functionality could pose a risk to a patient’s 
safety if the device were to not function as intended.”). 
116 Id. at 16-17, 20-21. Examples in the draft guidance of functions that are 
intended to inform clinical management for non-serious situations or conditions 
include a machine-learning algorithm for which the logic and inputs are not 
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circumstances specified in nonbinding guidance documents may impress upon 
innovators a lurking possibility of regulation, allowing FDA to monitor new 
technologies informally without expending the administrative resources 
necessary for premarket approval or clearance of every product.  
These provisions leave considerable uncertainty as to whether and how far 
FDA will assert regulatory authority, making it advisable for innovators to 
consult with FDA to avoid surprises. Some innovators, such as the Duke Sepsis 
Watch System developers, are doing so.117 When innovators work closely with 
regulatory officials as they design their products, FDA has an opportunity to 
oversee and guide product development, and perhaps to decide that the product 
requires a more robust process of premarket clearance or approval. Other 
innovators, however, have described little to no interaction with FDA officials.118 
These include health systems with actively running AI systems that make 
predictions and recommendations about patient care.119 
 
In sum, the weight of FDA regulation of medical AI, as felt by innovators, 
appears to be fairly light—at least relative to many other biomedical devices. 
The landscape is complex, and developers of medical AI technologies intended 
for patient care face considerable uncertainty about whether and to what extent 
FDA will regulate these technologies as medical devices. Although some AI 
functions, such as staff optimization, are excluded from regulation as devices, 
FDA retains authority to regulate AI functions that are intended for use in the 
diagnosis, cure, mitigation, prevention, or treatment of a disease or condition in 
patients. The FDCA allows leeway for FDA to determine the appropriate level 
of regulatory controls for different devices depending on its assessment of the 
risks they present. FDA may nonetheless refrain from regulating some of these 
technologies, at least for now. In the face of uncertainty, some innovators may 
consult with FDA as they develop new technologies, allowing it to maintain 
oversight and to guide product development in ways that give it considerable 
control over patient risks.  
 
B.  Patent law 
 
Patents are typically considered an important incentive for biomedical 
innovation. In theory, patent law provides a unitary system of legal rights for 
inventions in all fields of technology.120 In practice, some industries rely on 
 
explained that alerts health care providers to triggers that may indicate 
cholesterol management issues. 
117 Sendak et al., supra note 29, at 6. 
118 Interview with anonymous head of an academic medical center’s machine 
learning program (Dec. 30, 2020); Email from anonymous member of a major 
academic medical center’s machine-learning implementation committee (Aug. 
24, 2020). 
119 Id. 
120 Indeed, members of the World Trade Organization may now be required 
to apply the same rules of patent law to all fields under Article 27(1) of the 
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patents more heavily than others,121 and courts and legislatures have adapted 
in a variety of ways.122 The pharmaceutical industry consistently reports that 
patent incentives are essential to its willingness to invest in new drug 
development, while the story is more mixed in other fields.123 Although many 
firms are pursuing patents on medical applications of AI and ML throughout the 
world,124 the patent eligibility of these inventions under U.S. law is nonetheless 
in some doubt in light of case law over the past decade.125 Some scholars have 
argued more broadly that aspects of patent doctrine (such as requirements for 
inventorship, nonobviousness, disclosure and claims) make it a poor fit for AI,126 
while others argue that the patent system can adapt as it has done in the past 
to allow for patents on other new technologies.127 The U.S. Patent & Trademark 
 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex 1C 
to the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (1995) (TRIPS 
Agreement).  
121 Luigi Orsenigo & Valerio Sterzio, Comparative Study of the Use of Patents 
in Different Industries, Working Paper no. 33/2010, Knowledge, 




122 See Mark A. Lemley and Dan L. Burk, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 
VA. L. REV. 1575 (2003) 
123 See, e.g., Iain Cockburn & Genia Long, The Importance of Patents to 
Innovation: Updated Cross-Industry Comparisons with Biopharmaceuticals, 25 
EXPERT OPINION ON THERAPEUTIC PATENTS 739 (2015); Bronwyn H. Hall & 
Megan MacGarvie, The Private Value of Software Patents, 39 RESEARCH POLICY 
994 (2009); Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the 
Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1255, 1286 (2009). 
124 See World Intellectual Property Organization, WIPO Technology Trends 
2019: Artificial Intelligence (2019) (noting that AI-related patenting is growing 
rapidly, with machine learning patent filings increasing at an average annual 
rate of 28% since 2013 and using patent data analytics to identify research 
trends in AI); Appleyard Lees, Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning in 
Healthcare: An Intellectual Property Perspective (Dec. 13, 2019), 
https://www.appleyardlees.com/artificial-intelligence-and-machine-learning-in-
healthcare/ (noting a “surge in filings of patent applications by companies that 
have not traditionally been associated with the healthcare sector” such as 
Google, Microsoft, and Apple). 
125 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. 
Prometheus Labs., 566 U.S. 66 (2012); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics, 569 U.S. 576 (2013); Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014). 
126 E.g., Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid & Xiaoquiong Liu, When Artificial 
Intelligence Systems Produce Inventions: An Alternative Model for Patent Law at 
the 3A Era, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 2215 (2018). 
127 Dan L. Burk, AI Patents and the Self-Assembling Machine, 105 
Minnnesota Law Review Headnotes (forthcoming), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3628791. 
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Office (PTO) recently published a report summarizing a range of views 
expressed in public comments on patent-related issues regarding artificial 
intelligence and affirming its priority “to promote the understanding and 
reliability of intellectual property (IP) rights in relation to AI technology.”128 In 
an environment of uncertainty, patents appear to provide weaker incentives for 
medical AI innovation. 
 
1. Patent eligibility 
 
Four decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court between 2010 and 2014 revived 
and extended long dormant judicial limitations on patentable subject matter for 
“laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.”129 Two decisions in 
particular have created uncertainty as to the patent eligibility of inventions in 
two fields that converge in medical AI: medical diagnostics and computer 
software.130  
In Mayo v. Prometheus131 the Court relied on the “laws of nature” exclusion 
to invalidate a patent on a method of optimizing treatment with a drug by 
measuring drug metabolite levels in a patient’s serum and comparing them to 
specified reference values to determine whether it is necessary to raise or lower 
the dosage level for the patient.132 The unanimous Court held that the 
 
128 U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Public Views on Artificial Intelligence 
and Intellectual Property at 1 (Oct. 2020), 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/USPTO_AI-Report_2020-
10-07.pdf.  
129 See supra note 125 and sources cited therein. The revived limitations 
claim authority from a number of older decisions including Funk Bros. Seed Co. 
v. Kalo Inoculant, 333 U.S. 127 (1948); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972); 
and Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978). Cf. Jeffrey S. Lefstin, The Three Faces 
of Prometheus: A Post-Alice Jurisprudence of Abstractions, 16 N.C.J.L. & TECH 
647, 651–56 (2015) (characterizing recent decisions as the Court “turn[ing] its 
back on the traditional framework for patent eligibility” that “drew the boundary 
of patent-eligibility at practical application” in favor of a new requirement of 
“inventive application.”). 
130 See Jeffrey S. Lefstin, Peter S. Mennell & David O. Taylor, Final Report 
of the Berkeley Center for Law & Technology Section 101 Workshop: Addressing 
Patent Eligibility Challenges, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 551, 581–591 (2018) 
(summarizing views expressed at a workshop including industry 
representatives, legal practitioners, legal scholars, and policymakers); Rebecca 
S. Eisenberg, Diagnostics Need Not Apply, 21 BOSTON U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 256 
(2015). 
131 566 U.S. 66 (2013). 
132 More specifically, the patent claimed: 
“A method of optimizing therapeutic efficacy for treatment of an immune-
mediated gastrointestinal disorder, comprising: 
“(a) administering a drug providing 6-thioguanine to a subject having said immune-
mediated gastrointestinal disorder; and  
“(b) determining the level of 6-thioguanine in said subject having said immune-
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relationship between metabolite levels and need to adjust drug dosage was a law 
of nature, and that the patent’s other claim elements (administering the drug 
and measuring metabolite levels in a patient) did not add enough to the recited 
natural correlations to qualify as patent-eligible processes.133  
Two years later, in Alice v. CLS Bank134 the Court relied on the exclusion for 
“abstract ideas” to invalidate a patent on a computer-implemented method for 
mitigating settlement risk in a transaction.135 The Court set forth a two-step 
patent eligibility test (the Alice/Mayo test): (1) is the claim directed to one of the 
judicial exclusions; and (2) if so, is there “an ‘inventive concept’—i.e., an element 
or combination of elements that is sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice 
amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the ineligible concept 
itself?”136  
 
mediated gastrointesti nal disorder, 
“wherein the level of 6-thioguanine less than about 230 pmol per 8x108 red blood cells 
indicates a need to increase the amount of said drug subsequently administered to said 
subject and 
“wherein the level of 6-thioguanine greater than about 400 pmol per 8x108 red blood 
cells indicates a need to decrease the amount of said drug subsequently ad ministered 
to said subject.” Id. at 74–75; U.S. Pat. No. 6,355,623 (issued March 12, 2002). 
133 566 U.S. at 72. 
134 573 U.S. 208 (2014). 
135 More specifically, the patent claimed:  
“A method of exchanging obligations as between parties, each party holding a 
credit record and a debit record with an exchange institution, the credit records and 
debit records for exchange of predetermined obligations, the method comprising the 
steps of:  
“(a) creating a shadow credit record and a shadow debit record for each 
stakeholder party to be held independently by a supervisory institution from the 
exchange institutions;  
“(b) obtaining from each exchange institution a start-of-day balance for each 
shadow credit record and shadow debit record;  
“(c) for every transaction resulting in an exchange obligation, the supervisory 
institution adjusting each respective party’s shadow credit record or shadow debit 
record, allowing only these transactions that do not result in the value of the shadow 
debit record being less than the value of the shadow credit record at any time, each 
said adjustment taking place in chronological order, and  
“(d) at the end-of-day, the supervisory institution instructing on[e] of the exchange 
institutions to exchange credits or debits to the credit record and debit record of the 
respective parties in accordance with the adjustments of the said permitted 
transactions, the credits and debits being irrevocable, time invariant obligations placed 
on the exchange institutions.” Id. at 213 fn. 2; U.S. Patent No. 5,970,479 (issued Oct. 
19, 1999). 
136 Id. at 217-18 (cleaned up). Critics say this test improperly conflates 
patent eligibility with satisfaction of patent law standards and creates 
considerable uncertainty as to the types of inventions that are patent eligible, 
particularly in the life sciences and information technology. Kevin Emerson 
Collins, Bilski and the Ambiguity of “An Unpatentable Abstract Idea,”15 LEWIS 
& CLARK L. REV. 37 (2011); John M. Golden, Flook Says One Thing, Diehr Says 
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Lower courts applying this test have invalidated hundreds of previously 
issued patents in recent years,137 often ruling on patent eligibility as a matter of 
law at the outset of litigation without developing an evidentiary record.138 The 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) and the Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO) have largely fallen in line behind the approach of the 
Supreme Court, although sometimes with explicit disagreement and lament.139 
The result has been considerable uncertainty as to what remains patent eligible 
in the fields of software, business methods, and medical diagnostics,140 as many 
patents are struck down and as the Federal Circuit and PTO consider arguments 
to narrow the exclusions.141 In this environment it is difficult to assess with 
 
Another: A Need for Housecleaning in the Law of Patentable Subject Matter, 82 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1765 (2014); Eisenberg; supra note 130. 
137 Robert Sachs, Alice: Benevolent Despot or Tyrant? Analyzing Five Years 
of Case Law Since Alice v. CLS Bank: Part I, IP WATCHDOG (Aug. 29, 2019), 
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/08/29/alice-benevolent-despot-or-tyrant-
analyzing-five-years-of-case-law-since-alice-v-cls-bank-part-i/id=112722/.  
138 For a thoughtful and comprehensive of recent cases see Paul R. 
Gugliuzza, THE PROCEDURE OF PATENT ELIGIBILITY, 97 TEX. L. REV. 571, 586–
591 (2018) (finding that courts often invalidate patent for lack of patentable 
subject matter at the pleading stage without developing an evidentiary record). 
139 Disagreement and lament appear in multiple opinions from members of 
the Federal Circuit concurring or dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc 
in Athena Diagnostics v. Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 2019 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 19979 (Fed. Cir. July 3, 2019) (denying rehearing en banc in Athena 
Diagnostics v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 915 F.3d 743 (Fed. Cir. 2019)). See, 
e.g., id. at 4-5 (opinion of Lourie, J., joined by Reyna & Chen J.J., concurring in 
the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc) (“If I could write on a clean slate, 
I would write as an exception to patent eligibility, as respects natural laws, only 
claims directed to the natural law itself …. I would not exclude uses or detection 
of natural laws…. But we do not write here on a clean slate; we are bound by 
Supreme Court precedent.”); id. at 8-9 (opinion of Hughes, J., joined by Prost, 
C.J. & Taranto, J., concurring in the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc) 
(“I agree that the language in Mayo, as later reinforced in Alice, forecloses this 
court from adopting an approach or reaching a result different from the panel 
majority’s. I also agree, however, that the bottom line for diagnostics patents is 
problematic. But this is not a problem that we can solve. As an inferior appellate 
court, we are bound by the Supreme Court.”).  
140 Lefstin et al., supra note 130; Shahrokh Falati, Patent Eligibility of 
Disease Diagnosis, 21 N.C.J.L. & TECH. 63 (2020); David O. Taylor, Amending 
Patent Eligibility, 50 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 2149 (2017); Robert Sachs, Alice: 
Benevolent Despot or Tyrant? Analyzing Five Years of Case Law Since Alice v. 
CLS Bank: Part II, IP WATCHDOG (Sept. 3, 2019), 
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/09/03/alice-benevolent-despot-or-tyrant-
analyzing-five-years-of-case-law-since-alice-v-cls-bank-part-ii/id=112769/.  
141 The Federal Circuit and the PTO continue to consider arguments to apply 
the Alice/Mayo two-part test narrowly. See, e.g., Rapid Litigation Management 
v. CellzDirect, 827 F.3d 1042, 1047-49 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (claimed method for 
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confidence the patent eligibility of medical AI inventions—but it is 
straightforward to conclude that patents on medical AI face real challenges in 
meeting this requirement. 
 
2. Patent disclosure requirements 
 
Beyond the threshold issue of patent eligibility, medical AI innovators may 
have difficulty satisfying patent law requirements for an enabling disclosure of 
how to make and use the invention, a written description of the invention, and 
claims that particularly point out and distinctly claim the invention.142 As one 
of us has previously explained,143 it should be possible to provide a written 
description that discloses a formally transparent AI algorithm, however 
complex, in sufficient detail to permit a person of ordinary skill to make and use 
the invention.144 Even for a formally opaque algorithm that is the product of an 
opaque machine-learning algorithm, it may be possible to enable others to make 
and use the invention by depositing the data used and the machine-learning 
algorithm in a publicly available repository.145 But because the scope of 
 
producing a preparation of hepatocyte cells for later use that involved multiple 
freeze-thaw cycles was not “directed to” the patent-ineligible discovery that such 
cells were able to survive multiple freeze-thaw cycles); Enfish v. Microsoft, 822 
F.3d 1327, 1335-39 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (claimed method was directed to an 
improvement in computer-related technology rather than to abstract idea of 
organizing data into a table); Vanda Pharms. v. West-Ward Pharms., 887 F.3d 
1117 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (claims reciting method of treatment based on results of 
diagnostic test are not excluded from patent eligibility notwithstanding that 
treatment steps are conventional), cert. petition filed, call for views of solicitor 
general sub nom. Hikma Pharms. v. Vanda Pharms. (Mar. 18, 2019); Natural 
Alternatives v. Creative Compounds, 918 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (method of 
treatment claims patent eligibility even though method uses natural products 
and treatment steps involve conventional, well-known activity). The Supreme 
Court has resisted pleas to revisit patent subject matter eligibility, Hikma 
Pharms. v. Vanda Pharms., 140 S. Ct. 911 (2020); HP v. Berkheimer, 140 S. Ct. 
911 (2020), though the Solicitor General has noted that recent cases “have 
fostered substantial uncertainty” and that “[t]he confusion created by this 
Court’s recent Section 101 precedents warrants review in an appropriate case.” 
Hikma Pharms. v. Vanda Pharms., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae 
at 8 (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/18/18-
817/124768/20191206151701002_18-817%20-%20Hikma%20-%20CVSG%20-
%20v28.pdf. 
142 35 U.S.C. § 112(a), (b). 
143 W. Nicholson Price II, Big Data, Patents, and the Future of Medicine, 37 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1401, 1427–32 (2015). 
144 Id. at 1429. 
145 Id. (observing that biotechnology inventors have relied on similar 
deposits of unique biological materials to enable their inventions in patent 
applications). See also Burk, supra note 127, at 2 (noting that “in many cases the 
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enablement limits the scope of allowable patent rights, the resulting patent 
might be quite narrow if the opacity of the algorithm makes it impossible to 
generalize beyond the very specific example that has been disclosed.146 Formally 
opaque algorithms present similar challenges for satisfying the requirements of 
written description and claim definiteness: even when it is possible to state in 
words what the algorithm is, it may be challenging to claim it in broad enough 
terms for the patent to have commercial value.147 
Compliance with the disclosure requirements of patent law, even when 
possible, has another notable downside for medical AI innovators: disclosure of 
data and algorithms may destroy more effective protection for these innovations 
as trade secrets.148 Access to data and control of large datasets has considerable 
competitive value for AI innovators, an advantage they might well hesitate to 
surrender in exchange for patent rights of uncertain validity and scope. 
 
Taken together, these doctrinal challenges reduce the power of the patent 
system as an incentive for innovation in medical AI—at least, relative to that 
system’s power in other areas of biomedical innovation such as drugs and 
conventional medical devices.149 Patents are more difficult to obtain, of more 
doubtful validity when granted, and more likely to cover relatively narrow 
inventions. We do not claim that patents are unavailable or that the incentives 
are negligible; indeed, commercial firms have filed many applications for patents 
on inventions involving medical AI. Our point is simply that patent protection is 
more uncertain for this technology—a risk that may discourage commercial 
product developers more than it discourages the user innovators that are our 
focus here.  
  
C.  Insurance reimbursement 
 
A third innovation policy lever that plays a different and diminished role in 
the AI space is insurance reimbursement. In most of the examples described in 
Part II, AI innovators will have difficulty obtaining reimbursement directly for 
the use of their AI technology from insurers, whether public (such as Medicare 
and Medicaid) or private.150 To be clear, as noted in Part II, some AI tools may 
 
solutions developed for the patenting of biotechnological inventions appear to 
provide ready answers to the concerns raised regarding patents and AI 
technologies”).  
146 Price, supra note 143, at 1429. 
147 Id. at 1430–32. 
148 Id. at 1432-36. 
149 As noted above, the biomedical industry is not the only relevant baseline; 
incentives provided by patents for medical AI may more closely resemble those 
for software more generally, where patents have long been of questionable value. 
Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software 
Industry, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2001); Graham et al., supra note 123, at 1262. 
150 For some explicitly diagnostic AI technologies, insurance reimbursement 
may be available. However, those technologies are not the focus of this Article. 
 












Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 182 [2021]
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/182
 NEW INNOVATION MODELS IN MEDICAL AI 35 
make health care delivery more efficient and enable providers to earn more 
revenue on that basis, such as by allowing them to treat more patients. But the 
lack of direct reimbursement distinguishes these AI innovations from traditional 
health care technologies like pharmaceuticals or medical devices. 
Manufacturers of typical new products can expect that their products will be 
reimbursed by insurers—and the prospect of reimbursement factors into 
innovation decisions.151 Insurance will not provide reimbursement for the cost of 
using the innovations we consider, nor will reimbursement decisions provide 
quality oversight in this context. 
Insurance reimbursement has not traditionally been recognized as part of 
the innovation policy toolkit, but in recent years scholars have increased their 
focus on insurance as a key driver of innovation incentives for health care 
technologies.152 Insurance reimbursement functions very much like an 
innovation prize.153 It is an ex post reward provided for the development of an 
innovative medical technology, funded largely by public subsidies, and reserves 
a relatively large role for the government or private insurers in setting the size 
of the award.154 Insurers’ decisions to provide reimbursement for a new drug or 
device create a market for that product, and innovators respond by investing in 
the development of products that they expect will find a ready market (in the 
form of insurance reimbursement) once they make them available.155 
 
They are much more likely to fit into the classic medical device paradigm and 
likely also are subject to FDA review.  
151 In the case of prescription drugs, insurers are often compelled by law to 
provide such reimbursement. Rachel E. Sachs, Delinking Reimbursement, 102 
MINN. L. REV. 2307, 2316–17 (2018). 
152 See, e.g., Sachs, Prizing Insurance, supra note 8, at 178; Rebecca S. 
Eisenberg & W. Nicholson Price II, Promoting Healthcare Innovation on the 
Demand Side, 4 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 3, 5 (2017); Mark A. Lemley, Lisa Larrimore 
Ouellette, & Rachel E. Sachs, The Medicare Innovation Subsidy, 95 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 75, 105–07 (2020); Kevin Outterson, The Legal Ecology of Resistance: The 
Role of Antibiotic Resistance in Pharmaceutical Innovation, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 
613, 645–55 (2010); Arti K. Rai, The Ends of Intellectual Property: Health as a 
Case Study, 70 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 128–29 (2007); Benjamin N. Roin, 
Intellectual Property Versus Prizes: Reframing the Debate, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 
999, 1012–13 (2014).  
153 Sachs, Prizing Insurance, supra note 8; See also generally, e.g., Michael 
Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115 (2003); Nancy 
Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive 
System?, in 2 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 
2002); see also Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards Versus 
Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525, 528 (2001) (cataloging the 
literature). 
154 Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes 
Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 303, 307–08, 348 (2013) 
155 These pressures are less acute for non-health goods, which typically 
require fewer resources to develop in the first instance (as the FDA review 
process is both costly and time consuming) and which are typically inexpensive 
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The creation of Medicare Part D is an example of these dynamics. When 
Medicare Part D was passed in 2003,156 it provided a prescription drug benefit 
to many Medicare enrollees who had previously lacked coverage entirely, or who 
had less comprehensive coverage.157 As a result, Part D expanded the potential 
market for pharmaceutical companies by both increasing the number of seniors 
with the ability to pay for their products and by increasing the prices that 
pharmaceutical companies could expect to recoup for sales to seniors who 
previously had less remunerative insurance.158 Economists studying Part D 
found that after its passage, pharmaceutical investment increased in drug 
classes with higher Medicare market share.159 Economists analyzing other 
market-creating policy changes (such as particular coverage mandates) have 
found similar results.160 
But direct insurance reimbursement is unlikely for these new AI 
technologies. Some functions are not directly reimbursable at all, such as AI 
systems that help schedule emergency rooms or reduce patient waiting time. 
Risk predictors that are routinely run for all patients, such as predictors of 
sepsis or readmission risk, are similarly unlikely to be directly billed or 
 
enough to enable consumers to purchase them directly. Americans might be able 
to save up for a new or used smartphone—a one-time purchase costing several 
hundred dollars—but cannot afford more than a million dollars per year for a 
lifesaving medication. See, e.g., Katie Thomas & Reed Abelson, The $6 Million 
Drug Claim, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/25/health/drug-prices-rare-diseases.html. 
156 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified in scattered sections of 26 
and 42 U.S.C.) Part D was not created until nearly forty years after the passage 
of the initial Medicare statute. PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICAN MEDICINE 368–70 (1982). 
157 KAISER FAMILY FOUND., PRESCRIPTION DRUG TRENDS 2010 5 (May 2010) 
(“Prior to January 1, 2006, . . . about one-quarter (27%) of seniors age 65 and 
older, and one-third of poor (34%) and near-poor (33%) seniors, had no drug 
coverage.”); see also Dana Gelb Safran et al., Prescription Drug Coverage and 
Seniors: Findings from a 2003 National Survey, HEALTH AFF. W5-152, W5-160 
(Apr. 19, 2005), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2005/04/19/
hlthaff.w5.152.citation. 
158 Richard G. Frank & Joseph P. Newhouse, Should Drug Prices Be 
Negotiated Under Part D of Medicare? And If So, How?, 27 HEALTH AFF. 33, 34, 
36–37 (2008). 
159 See Margaret E. Blume-Kohout & Neeraj Sood, The Impact of Medicare 
Part D on Pharmaceutical R&D 12–13 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 13857, 2008). But see David Dranove et al., Pharmaceutical Profits 
and the Social Value of Innovation 6–7 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 20212, 2014) (qualifying the findings of Blume-Kohout and Sood by 
noting that truly innovative activity takes longer to emerge). 
160 See, e.g., Amy Finkelstein, Static and Dynamic Effects of Health Policy: 
Evidence from the Vaccine Industry, 119 Q.J. ECON. 527, 528 (2004); Wesley Yin, 
Market Incentives and Pharmaceutical Innovation, 27 J. HEALTH ECON. 1060, 
1061 (2008). 
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reimbursable; instead, they are more likely to be folded into overall facilities 
charges. Providers may nonetheless recover these costs diffusely, as they seek 
reimbursement for the care they provide as a whole.  
To be sure, there may be financial incentives to use new health care 
technologies even without specific insurance reimbursement for them. AI 
technologies that have the potential to increase clinical volume (or even the 
explicit goal of doing so), such as the example from Cedars-Sinai discussed in 
Part II, would likely enable providers to earn more money for the increased 
services they provide, even if they would not be able to bill directly for the use of 
the AI product. And some administrative AI tools can increase insurance 
reimbursement for non-AI services by scouring medical records for billable 
efforts or diagnoses that may not have been coded for reimbursement.161 
Other forms of indirect financial incentives come from attempts to alter 
payment methodologies to reimburse providers for the value, rather than the 
volume, of the care they provide. Some are more formal: the Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) has been working to increase the amount of 
its reimbursement that is based on quality or value, both in the hospital setting 
and in the outpatient physician setting.162 Prior to these and other reforms, 
providers may have obtained more reimbursement if a patient suffered an 
avoidable complication (such as a fall or certain hospital-acquired infections), as 
the providers could then bill for the treatment of that complication on top of their 
earlier services.163 But if providers can no longer bill for treating complications 
like these—or if they even face financial penalties for their occurrence—health 
systems may have greater incentives to develop and adopt AI technologies that 
would reduce adverse events, such as the Sepsis Watch program,164 or UT 
Southwestern’s readmission risk predictor.165 Some changes are informal: using 
AI technology to improve efficiency or quality may provide leverage to negotiate 
 
161 One hospital uses machine learning to identify un-coded reimbursable 
elements in electronic health record notes, and flags them for review by manual 
reviewers. Interview with anonymous head of an academic medical center’s 
machine learning program (Dec. 30, 2020). 
162 See, e.g., Sylvia M. Burwell, Setting Value-Based Payment Goals—HHS 
Efforts to Improve U.S. Health Care, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 897, 897 (2015); 
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., HHS to Deliver Value-Based 
Transformation in Primary Care (April 22, 2019), 
https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2019/04/22/hhs-deliver-value-based-
transformation-primary-care.html. 
163 See, e.g., Teresa M. Waters et al., Effect of Medicare’s Nonpayment for 
Hospital Acquired Conditions: Lessons for Future Policy, 175 JAMA INTERNAL 
MED. 347 (2015). 
164 Duke Today, Duke Health Licenses Technology Aimed to Reduce Sepsis in 
Hospitals (July3, 2019), https://today.duke.edu/2019/07/duke-health-licenses-
technology-aimed-reduce-sepsis-hospitals. 
165 Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Hospital Readmissions 
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higher reimbursement rates for care. At least one health system has been able 
to negotiate higher rates for office visits in part because its predictive algorithms 
decrease the number of hospitalizations.166 
Nevertheless, though there are certainly reimbursement-inflected 
incentives for development of medical AI, especially by user-innovators, these 
incentives are less direct than for traditional new biomedical products. If 
policymakers want greater innovation for a certain type of vaccine, for instance, 
they can commit to reimburse that vaccine at a higher rate to drive that 
innovation; this type of explicit, reimbursement-driven incentive structure, and 
its associated policy tools, is less prominent in the medical AI space. 
Another innovation-related benefit of insurance is also difficult to apply in 
this space: the role insurance plays in ensuring quality oversight of new health 
products. Insurance companies often serve as independent evaluators of new 
medical technologies, demanding information on the safety and efficacy of 
particular products before agreeing to provide reimbursement for them. Even if 
laws require insurance coverage, as they do for many payers in the case of new 
drugs,167 insurers may use information about drug effects to create preferred 
drug lists, favoring some drugs over others, or to create prior authorization 
requirements that impose additional administrative hurdles on physicians and 
patients before they can obtain a particular product.168 
 Insurers’ quality oversight role is particularly important when the FDA 
is less likely to require data from high quality studies as a condition of market 
access.169 Although FDA review of new medical devices is far less stringent than 
review of new drugs, insurers often demand that additional criteria are met—
beyond FDA authorization—before they will agree to cover a particular 
product.170 Insurer review may thus fill the gap in FDA’s information-forcing 
function for less regulated products.171 But when FDA oversight is weak or 
unlikely, and insurers are not directly reviewing AI tools for possible 
reimbursement, there is reason for concern about the quality of these AI 
innovations.  
To be sure, in some cases it will be readily apparent that an AI tool is not 
effective for its intended use. If sepsis rates do not drop, or if 30-day readmission 
 
166 Interview with anonymous head of an academic medical center’s machine 
learning program (Dec. 30, 2020). 
167 Rachel E. Sachs, Delinking Reimbursement, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2307 
(2018). 
168 Cigna, What is Prior Authorization and How Does the Process Work? 
(2018), https://www.cigna.com/individuals-families/understanding-
insurance/what-is-prior-authorization.  
169 See supra Part III.A. 
170 Nick Paul Taylor, CMS Rejects 1st Colorectal Cancer Blood Test, Tweaks 
Path for Exact, Guardant and Others, HEALTHCAREDIVE (Jan. 21, 2021), 
https://www.healthcaredive.com/news/cms-rejects-1st-colorectal-cancer-blood-
test-tweaks-path-for-exact-guarda/593657/.  
171 Rebecca S. Eisenberg & W. Nicholson Price II, Promoting Healthcare 
Innovation on the Demand Side, 4 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 3 (2017); Rebecca S. 
Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & 
TECH. L. REV. 345 (2007). 
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rates are unchanged, a health system may re-evaluate its approach for that AI 
product. But in other cases it will be more difficult to identify whether an AI tool 
is safe and effective. Perhaps the tool does work to drive down the rate of the 
complication targeted by the algorithm—but maybe there are also many false 
positives, and many patients receive unnecessary treatment as a result. Or, as 
we have already noted, perhaps the tool benefits some racial groups and not 
others.172 A lack of direct insurance reimbursement makes it much more difficult 




The previous two Parts have catalogued how user innovators face 
substantially different incentives and development costs in the medical AI 
context than manufacturers face for more familiar biomedical products like 
traditional medical devices or drugs. Patents and insurance reimbursement 
provide weaker incentives for these innovations. But the development costs and 
barriers to entry are lower as well. Many of these medical AI innovations have 
been developed and used without going through a potentially lengthy FDA 
approval or clearance process. Nor do they require building new production 
facilities; while assembling data and informatics capacity can be expensive, 
institutions that have these resources may develop and implement AI products 
relatively inexpensively. Lower development costs make innovation a 
reasonable investment even when benefits are lower, and even when benefits 
come primarily from internal efficiency improvements rather than from external 
market sales.173  
This legal landscape enables user innovation by health systems and insurers 
and has at least three interconnected implications for innovation processes. 
First, the availability and quality of data impacts both who can innovate and the 
quality of their innovations. Second, the products that result are often 
contextualized, focusing on custom solutions to local problems. Such products 
may be less easily influenced by policy tools aimed at increasing broader social 
welfare. Third and finally, these products face less oversight than do many 
biomedical products, leading to the risk of quality problems that may be difficult 
to detect.  
 
A.  Data control  
 
A substantial barrier to innovation in this space seems to be the availability 
of high-quality data on which to train AI, which limits the types of users who 
can successfully innovate. AI requires large amounts of data, and assembling, 
 
172 See Obermeyer, supra note 62. 
173 An instructive parallel is laboratory-developed diagnostic tests. True, 
FDA exercises enforcement discretion against the makers of laboratory-
developed tests at least in part because those tests were traditionally relatively 
simple. But it seems also likely that institutions are willing to develop and use 
their own tests when that development might not be cost-effective if coupled 
with an FDA approval or clearance process. 
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formatting, and curating those data from multiple and heterogeneous sources is 
an expensive task.174 Accordingly, developing AI seems to be easiest for those 
entities that already possess substantial stores of data—among them large 
health systems (especially academic medical centers) and health insurers.175 
Indeed, even those data-holders uninterested in developing their own projects 
have gotten into the game. The Veterans Administration, while engaging in 
minimal internal AI projects for reasons including a lack of expert programmers, 
has entertained many requests for collaboration and tool-building, largely based 
on the value of its substantial longitudinal dataset.176 And insurers have used 
the lure of their data as a prize for developers who create useful algorithms.177 
Although advantageous for health systems and insurers, the central role of data 
access has problematic implications. 
One potential source of concern is the size of datasets available to user 
innovators. If in-house development relies on in-house data, only some entities 
will have access to the very large datasets necessary for training high-quality 
AI. They may be able to create solid products for their own use (though the 
performance of single-system development even with very large datasets may 
lag the performance that could be obtained from training similar algorithms 
across multi-system data178). Entities with smaller datasets are more likely to 
introduce quality problems or biases into resulting AI systems. A particularly 
dangerous middle ground are those entities that have sufficient data to plausibly 
create useful AI products, but insufficient data to weed out possible bias or 
performance issues. Moreover, the ability of some powerful actors within the 
health system to develop in-house products based solely on their own data may 
reduce the impetus for broader data-sharing efforts, including the creation of 
large-scale centralized datasets.179 Indeed, the value of data as a resource for AI 
 
174 W. Nicholson Price II, Patents, Big Data, and the Future of Medicine, 37 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1401 (2016). 
175 W. Nicholson Price II, Medical AI and Contextual Bias, 33 Harv. J.L. & 
Tech. 65, 81–83 (2020) (hereinafter Price, Contextual Bias); see also VON HIPPEL 
at 8 (“When information is sticky, innovators tend to rely largely on information 
they already have in stock.”). 
176 Interview with anonymous Veterans Affairs official involved in 
informatics (June 25, 2020). 
177 See, e.g., Announcement of Requirements and Registration for “Artificial 
Intelligence Health Outcomes Challenge”, U.S. Dept. Health & Human Services, 
(June 7, 2019), https://innovation.cms.gov/Files/x/aichallenge-pubnotice.pdf; 
BlueCross BlueShield Data Innovation Challenge, Blue Health Intelligence, (April 
2019), https://www.bcbs.com/bluecross-blueshield-data-innovation-challenge. 
178 Jennifer Couzin-Frankel, Artificial intelligence could revolutionize 
medical care. But don’t trust it to read your x-ray just yet, SCIENCE (Jun. 17, 
2019), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2019/06/artificial-intelligence-could-
revolutionize-medical-care-don-t-trust-it-read-your-x-ray. 
179 The All of US cohort is one such effort. See Joshua C. Denny et al., The 
“All of Us” Research Program, 381 N. ENGL. J. MED. 668, 668 (2019). 
Theoretically, large-scale organizations could self-organize to promote data-
sharing, but there are structural barriers to such efforts, including HIPAA and 
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product development may further encourage the trend of data-hoarding, slowing 
the development of better tools trained on larger aggregations of shared data. 
To be sure, some problems may truly demand localized solutions, as the user 
innovation literature points out; perhaps the factors that drive C. difficile 
infection in one hospital are fundamentally different from those that drive 
infection in another.180 But perhaps not. At a minimum, it would be worth 
probing why such a biological result seems so context-dependent.181 For other 
products, like a staffing prediction or patient-flow model, context specificity 
seems likely to be typical. It is nonetheless problematic that smaller entities may 
have smaller datasets for their own context, and are therefore at higher risk of 
developing erroneous AI systems.  
If the availability of data is a major hurdle, we should also expect to see 
substantial discrepancies among health entities in their ability to develop their 
own AI systems at all. Small community health systems, for instance, are much 
less likely to have the data capacity (or, for that matter, the information-
technology capacity) to develop their own algorithms. To the extent that self-
developed AI systems adapted to a particular system become important for 
providing high-quality health care, for interacting with insurers or other 
systems, or for maintaining a competitive level of efficiency, smaller systems will 
be especially disadvantaged. If smaller systems react by attempting to adopt AI 
products developed in larger systems, systematic quality or bias problems may 
occur as a result of differences in patient populations and care patterns, as 
described in Section IV.C below.182 More optimistically, perhaps larger systems 
that develop successful products for their own use will license them to 
commercial firms to test and refine them further for more widespread use by 
smaller systems as commercial products. 
 
B.  Contextualized products  
 
Health systems and insurers as user innovators are likely to develop 
different products for different needs than firms developing biomedical 
innovations for sale to others. Most obviously, as the user innovation literature 
suggests, user innovators (whether health systems, insurers, or some other type 
of entity) will tend to develop products that are closely suited to their own 
 
other privacy protections. See W. Nicholson Price II, Risk and Resilience in 
Health Data Infrastructure, 16 COLO. TECH. L.J. no. 1 (2017) (hereinafter Price, 
Risk and Resilience). If large organizations can make substantial progress using 
only their own data—even if this progress falls short of what consolidated 
datasets might permit—they face lower incentives to try to overcome those 
barriers. 
180 Cf. Jenna Wiens et al. A study in transfer learning: leveraging data from 
multiple hospitals to enhance hospital-specific predictions, 21 J. AM. MED. 
INFORMATICS ASSN. 699, 699 (2014) (finding better performance of C. difficile 
infections when a model was trained on data from multiple hospitals).  
181 See W. Nicholson Price II & Arti K. Rai, Clearing Opacity through 
Machine Learning, 106 IOWA L. REV. __ (2021).  
182 See Price, Contextual Bias, supra note 175, at 90–98. 
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particular needs.183  
AI may be especially useful for such contextual solutions. Where data 
formats, care patterns, and health problems are specific to a particular context, 
as the fragmented nature of U.S. health care suggests will be common,184 AI 
products developed by users may be an effective solution that would be 
foreclosed if development costs and legal hurdles were higher. Thus, health 
systems can develop products to model and predict patient flow that are 
particularly responsive to their own patient dynamics.185 Duke’s Sepsis Watch 
AI tool illustrates the importance of user-developed contextual knowledge to 
technical AI success. This app, developed by a team at Duke University, uses 
machine learning to determine a patient’s risk of developing sepsis; however, in 
order for Sepsis Watch to work, successful implementation has required 
disruption to the ordinary workflow in the emergency department; Duke ER 
nurses, assigned as primary users of the app, needed to reverse the typical ER 
chain of command to alert ER physicians of the app’s findings. This kind of 
disruption may have doomed another AI product, but Duke’s Sepsis Watch tool 
has been very successful at significantly reducing sepsis-induced patient deaths 
at Duke Health. This success is at least partially due to the fact that Sepsis 
Watch was created for the specific context of the Duke emergency department. 
Madeleine Eilish, a member of the Duke team evaluating the implementation of 
Sepsis Watch at Duke, cited the context-specific user development of Sepsis 
Watch as one of the keys to the app’s success, noting that “the tool was adapted 
for a hyper-local, hyper-specific context: it was developed for the emergency 
department at Duke Health and nowhere else.”186  
 
183 VON HIPPEL, supra note 6, at 8 (“One consequence of the information 
asymmetry between users and manufacturers is that users tend to develop 
innovations that are functionally novel, requiring a great deal of user-need 
information and use-context information for their development. In contrast, 
manufacturers tend to develop innovations that are improvements on well-
known needs and that require a rich understanding of solution information for 
their development.”) 
184 See, e.g., John Wennberg et al., An Agenda for Change: Improving Quality 
and Curbing Health Care Spending, DARTMOUTH INSTITUTE FOR HEALTH POLICY 
AND CLINICAL PRACTICE (2008) (describing practice variations and pattern 
changes); OFF. NAT’L COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO. TECH., CONNECTING 
HEALTH AND CARE FOR THE NATION: A 10-YEAR VISION TO ACHIEVE AN 
INTEROPERABLE HEALTH IT INFRASTRUCTURE (2014), 
http://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/ONC10year 
InteroperabilityConceptPaper.pdf (describing interoperability and data 
fragmentation challenges). 
185 Michael Thompson, New Ways to Improve Hospital Flow with Predictive 




186 Karen Hao, How an AI tool for fighting hospital deaths actually worked 
in the real world, MIT TECH. REV. (October 2, 2020), 
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One potential concern that might arise from this different landscape is 
whether innovative efforts are being put toward the most socially beneficial 
uses.187 Innovators engage in efforts based on the data that they have, the 
incentives they face in their own contexts, and the particular problems that seem 
most pressing to them. Sometimes this can reflect useful customization to 
genuinely local problems, as the user innovation literature suggests.188 But 
problems that are especially pressing for one academic medical center may 
reflect systematic problems that are best tackled at a broader level, rather than 
having individual institutions each devoting limited innovation resources to 
addressing the same problems locally. Siloed local innovation may also decrease 
the opportunities for learning from others—a problem that may be especially 
aggravated if privacy laws make it more difficult to share data with other 
institutions.189  
Where context is not particularly important, user innovation may be less 
important. For instance, although there is some user innovation related to 
billing,190 examples are not plentiful. On the other hand, there are already 
several commercial products available that use AI for billing optimization, 
suggesting that context specificity may be less important for this type of product 
and it can more readily be developed by outsiders for sale to a broader market. 
The commercially developed 3M 360 Encompass System,191 for example, scans 
medical records to identify services that were provided to a patient, suggesting 
which codes can be billed to insurers.192 On the insurer side, Kirontech touts the 




187 In a highly stylized account of how patents promote innovation, the 
patent system theoretically directs innovators to make the most socially 
beneficial innovations by linking rewards to the market value of patented 
goods—but as we have discussed, the incentives from the patent system appear 
to be less salient in this context. In addition, a substantial literature catalogs 
the limits of the ability of patents to drive socially beneficial innovation. E.g., 
Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The Continuum of Excludability and the Limits 
of Patents, 122 YALE L.J. 1900 (2013); Sachs, Prizing Insurance, supra note 8; 
Amy Kapczynski, The Cost of Price: Why and How to Get Beyond Intellectual 
Property Internalism, 59 UCLA L. REV. 970 (2011), W. Nicholson Price II, The 
Cost of Novelty, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 769 (2020). 
188 VON HIPPEL, supra note 6, at 33–44. 
189 See I. Glenn Cohen & Michelle M. Mello, Big Data, Big Tech, and 
Protecting Patient Privacy, 322 JAMA 1141, 1141–42 (2019). 
190 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
191 3M, Real-time clinical insights for physicians and CDI teams, 
https://www.3m.com/3M/en_US/health-information-systems-
us/providers/clinical-documentation/cdi-engage-one/. 
192 3M Health Information Systems, Real results: A profile of eight 
organizations boosted by the 3M™ 360 Encompass™ System, 
https://multimedia.3m.com/mws/media/955410O/3m-360-encompass-real-
results-8-profiles.pdf. 
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validate claims and to detect fraudulent health insurance claims in real time.193 
 
C.  Decreased quality oversight 
 
Medical AI innovations are likely to be implemented with less independent 
quality oversight relative to other medical devices, including commercially 
developed point-of-care AI. As described above, quality oversight for some new 
health technologies comes from FDA regulation and insurance coverage 
determinations, both of which provide some assessment of quality. These two 
players have a smaller role in assessing many of the products we describe here, 
leading to less oversight for safety and effectiveness. Thus, many algorithms 
that may have an impact on patient care receive less vetting before they are 
implemented and may thus cause harm because of undiscovered error.194  
We need not look far to see how such error might occur.195 One team at Mt. 
Sinai developed an AI algorithm to identify pneumonia based on patient chest 
x-ray images.196 The algorithm was trained on Mt. Sinai data, where many chest 
x-rays came from patients with pneumonia, and detected pneumonia 93% of the 
time.197 When the algorithm was tested on images from the NIH and the Indiana 
Network for Patient care, performance dropped sharply. One reason was that 
the rates of pneumonia at those sites were lower, and the patient populations 
were different. Another reason was that the algorithm had learned to predict 
outcomes based on whether the image came from a portable x-ray machine or a 
fixed machine—and the latter are typically used on sick patients.198 Had this 
algorithm been developed and deployed for clinical care, such a performance 
pattern would be highly problematic. The algorithm might appear to function 
decently at Mt. Sinai, since it would be relying on the same provider-created 
information (e.g., the use of portable x-rays) that it was trained on—but it 
wouldn’t provide as much useful information as the hospital thought, and its 
performance would degrade over time as care patterns shifted. If, for instance, 
 
193 Kirontech, Medical Payment Integrity, https://www.kirontech.com/ 
194 To be sure, algorithms that have the highest impact on patient care are 
those FDA is most likely to regulate, and even if software does not normally fall 
within the definition of a medical device under the Cures Act, FDA can 
determine that the software needs to be regulated anyway. 21 U.S.C. § 
360j(o)(3)(A). 
195 Jennifer Couzin-Frankel, Artificial intelligence could revolutionize 
medical care. But don’t trust it to read your x-ray just yet, SCIENCE (Jun. 17, 
2019), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2019/06/artificial-intelligence-could-
revolutionize-medical-care-don-t-trust-it-read-your-x-ray. 
196 John R. Zech, Marcus A. Badgeley, Manway Liu, Anthony B. Costa, 
Joseph J. Titano, & Eric K. Oermann, Variable generalization performance of a 
deep learning model to detect pneumonia in chest radiographs: A cross-sectional 




198 Id. at 13. 
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the hospital shifted to using portable x-ray machines more broadly, the 
algorithm would suggest that many more people had pneumonia, relying on an 
unreliable proxy signal. An even worse situation would arise if the algorithm 
were deployed at other sites, such as the Indiana network, without testing; 
performance would be substantially worse, but provider-users could easily be 
none the wiser. To be sure, the type of testing described here is exactly the type 
of quality oversight we might hope for, where developers evaluate performance 
in different contexts. And such patterns might help demonstrate a culture of 
excellence of the sort that FDA is emphasizing in its recent thinking about 
regulating medical AI. Unfortunately, the vast majority of AI image analysis 
algorithms are tested at only one hospital, suggesting that such problematic 
development patterns are all too likely to go unnoticed.199  
The failure of some AI systems will be obvious—readmissions might increase 
rather than decrease—but others may go undetected. Health outcomes are 
notoriously difficult to attribute to a particular intervention, which is why health 
technology is described as a credence good and why formal regulatory oversight 
is justified.200 For other problematic outcomes, the results may be observable but 
not actually observed; if hospital algorithms result in patients suffering ills that 
they self-treat with over-the-counter medications (being discharged too early, for 
instance), those problems might never come to the attention of the innovator.201  
Most perniciously, biased results—prioritizing wealthy or white patients, for 
instance—might well accord with a hospital’s bottom-line incentives of efficiency 
and revenue maximization, even if they are socially and morally repugnant and 
might otherwise be detected and blocked by a regulator. This sort of problem, 
too, has already occurred on a substantial scale.  
As Ziad Obermeyer and colleagues documented, Optum, a unit of the large 
insurer UnitedHealth Group, developed an AI system in-house to predict which 
patients were likely to have medical complications, with the aim of providing 
outpatient guidance services to particularly high-risk patients.202 This system 
 
199 Dong Wook Kim, Hye Young Jang, Kyung Won Kim, Youngbin Shin, & 
Seong Ho Park, Design characteristics of studies reporting the performance of 
artificial intelligence algorithms for diagnostic analysis of medical images: 
results from recently published papers, 20 KOREAN J. RADIOLOGY 405, 405 (2019) 
(finding that only 6% of 516 published studies for medical AI image analysis 
included external validation). 
200 Price, Regulating Black Box Medicine, supra note 2. 
201 The health system as a whole is generally poor at monitoring holistic 
patient outcomes and learning from them. The idea of a learning health system 
aims to fix this problem. See CLAUDIA GROSSMAN, BRIAN POWERS, & J. MICHAEL 
MCGINNIS, EDS., DIGITAL INFRASTRUCTURE FOR THE LEARNING HEALTH SYSTEM 
2–3 (2011); Harlan Krumholz, Big Data and New Knowledge in Medicine: The 
Thinking, Training, and Tools Needed for a Learning Health System, 33 HEALTH 
AFF. 1163, 1164–69 (2014). 
202 Ziad Obermeyer, Brian Powers, Christine Vogeli, & Sendhil 
Mullainathan, Dissecting racial bias in an algorithm used to manage the health 
of populations, 366 SCIENCE 447, 447 (2019); Heidi Ledford, Millions of black 
people affected by racial bias in health-care algorithms, 574 NATURE 608, 608 
(2019), (identifying the developer as Optum). 
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was developed, validated, and deployed in due course, and influenced the care 
received by many patients. But, as Obermeyer’s team found, the algorithm was 
not at all neutral. The developers used a reasonable proxy for complexity of 
patient care: how much was spent on the patient’s care. But they didn’t account 
for the fact that Black patients and other minority patients receive substantially 
less care, and consequently cost less—but for reasons of systemic bias or resource 
constraints, not because of medical differences. Accordingly, the algorithm 
predicted white patients as being of substantially higher risk than Black 
patients with the same ailments, with the result that white patients received 
more outpatient coordination services. The bias went unnoticed by the 
developers, presumably because the outcomes aligned reasonably with the 
algorithm’s goals of reducing costly complications, as measured by later costs. 
Eventually, oversight by academic researchers caught the problem, at least in 
this instance, and Optum agreed to work with Obermeyer’s team to fix the 
problem going forward.203 But this sort of bias could readily arise in unregulated 
use of medical AI. 
We do not mean to overstate the point about lessened oversight from key 
players. In particular, FDA retains the authority to regulate software as a 
medical device, even if the software initially falls into one of the Cures Act’s 
exclusions.204 But other players might have a role here as well. Learned societies 
could play some part in determining the quality of medical AI that fell within 
their respective bailiwicks. The American College of Radiologists, for instance, 
could evaluate medical AI that evaluates radiological images, though 
homegrown products might fly under the radar of learned societies as well. 
Another possibility would be to establish a system more analogous to the one 
used by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services in their administration 
of the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments program (CLIA).205 
Although the FDA may be exercising its enforcement discretion as it relates to 
the oversight of LDTs, those laboratories still receive a form of regulation 
through CLIA, and laboratories must obtain CLIA certification if they wish to 
receive reimbursement from Medicare and Medicaid more generally.206 Indeed, 
FDA and other regulators may ultimately design such a mechanism in the 





The development of AI tools and the widespread adoption of electronic health 
records have fostered a model of innovation in medical AI that looks different 
from the more familiar cases of biomedical innovation to develop new drugs and 
traditional devices. Patents are less certain and less powerful; the FDA remains 
 
203 Ledford, supra note 202. 
204 See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
205 Ctr. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., CLIA, 
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/CLIA. 
206 See id.; see also footnote 102, supra. 
207 See supra notes 106-111 and accompanying text. 
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important but lurks in the background than rather than looming over product 
entry, and insurance reimbursement provides fewer direct incentives and also 
less quality oversight. And yet these products offer great prospects for improving 
patient care, whether they are predicting risky outcomes, monitoring vital signs, 
managing patient flow, or allocating resources. There is a world of medical AI 
innovation occurring inside health systems and insurers that differs from 
commercial product development in important ways. We do not suggest that we 
have fully characterized this world, or that we know how to solve the problems 
that may arise. Nor is the world fully separate; products that start their life as 
user innovation in a single health system may well be spun out into start-up 
companies or acquired by existing manufacturers, making the transition from 
user innovation to a more classic commercialization model, where different legal 
regimes and incentives apply. Nevertheless, the space of user innovation in 
medical AI is worth further examination. We have aimed here to point out its 
major features, to indicate its importance, and to raise the call for future study. 
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